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GROUPS AND RIGHTS IN INSTITUTIONAL
REFORM LITIGATION
David Marcus*
Lawsuits pursue institutional reform when plaintiffs ask courts to issue broad,
systemic remedies to improve the performance of malfunctioning government programs.
Once thought in decline, this litigation persists. Plaintiffs continue to seek judicial
protection from dysfunctional prisons, immigration enforcement regimes, foster care
systems, and other institutions. But an important aspect of the substantive law that
institutional reform litigation involves has gone overlooked. This substantive law often
vests rights in groups. An institutional reform lawsuit does not always—or even
often—bundle large numbers of individual rights violations. Rather, a group of
incarcerated people or children in foster care sues to vindicate a group right to a
competently-administered institution.
During institutional reform’s formative era in the 1970s, important
commentators hinted that groups could bear rights. This suggestion sparked
controversy and subsequently disappeared from American public law scholarship. Over
the intervening decades, developments in procedural and remedial doctrines important
to institutional reform litigation have required litigants and courts to specify the
contours of the substantive law with increasing precision. These forces have prompted
group rights to coalesce, unobserved and largely without controversy, in various public
law domains. An account of this development provides a substantive foundation for a
new, up-to-date jurisprudence of institutional reform.
This Article makes three contributions. First, I connect rights design to institutional reform’s procedural and remedial features to demonstrate the existence of group
rights. The procedural, remedial, and substantive pieces of institutional reform’s
puzzle fit together best if plaintiffs vindicate group rights. Second, I describe what
group rights are and how they differ from what American public law scholarship once
supposed. Group rights do not require the existence of “natural” groups in American
public life. They can evolve for instrumental reasons. When courts have recognized
group rights, they have done so because rights designed in these terms best enable
litigation to realize the values and policies of the substantive law. Third, I show how
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an accurate understanding of rights design can help courts avoid errors that have
unjustly thwarted institutional reform efforts.
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INTRODUCTION
Lawsuits pursue institutional reform when plaintiffs sue
malfunctioning government institutions and seek broad, systemic
remedies to bring these institutions’ policies and practices in line with
applicable substantive law. Pioneered by the legal campaign against
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school segregation, 1 institutional reform (IR) litigation is now a staple
of the American judicial diet. In 2017, for example, a federal judge
documented a “skyrocketing” suicide rate in Alabama prisons and
“horrendously inadequate” mental healthcare there. 2 An extensive,
complex set of remedial interventions followed. 3 A consent decree
entered in 1997 governs the conditions under which the U.S.
government can hold immigrant juveniles in detention facilities.4 It
empowered a district judge in 2017 to remedy immigration authorities’
refusal to give detained children soap, toothbrushes, and blankets. 5
Settling a class action in 2020, Ohio agreed to a host of changes to its
policies and practices to protect adults with intellectual and
developmental disabilities from an unnecessary risk of
institutionalization. 6 In 2016, a class of young children with disabilities
won sweeping changes to how the District of Columbia meets its legal
obligations to educate them properly, showing that the district had
failed to provide special education services to a significant number of
qualifying preschoolers each month. 7
Cases like these and many more drew intense scholarly interest
during institutional reform’s formative era in the 1960s and 1970s. 8
These lawsuits’ proliferation sparked a legal and political backlash that
purportedly set IR litigation on a path toward oblivion in the 1980s and
1990s. 9 This story of decline has proven inaccurate. The current
scholarly consensus recognizes what the examples mentioned above
suggest, that IR litigation persists. 10 Indeed, new variants continue to
emerge. Over the past decade, innovative litigation brought to reform
1 E.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr. & George A. Rutherglen, Structural Reform Revisited, 95
CALIF. L. REV. 1387, 1408 (2007); Jason Parkin, Aging Injunctions and the Legacy of Institutional
Reform Litigation, 70 VAND. L. REV. 167, 176 (2017).
2 Braggs v. Dunn, 257 F. Supp. 3d 1171, 1186, 1267 (M.D. Ala. 2017).
3 Braggs v. Dunn, No. 14CV601, 2018 WL 985759, at *1 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 20, 2018)
(describing the process of fashioning a remedy).
4 Flores v. Barr, 934 F.3d 910, 911 (9th Cir. 2019).
5 Id. at 913.
6 See Ball v. Kasich, No. 16–CV–282, 2020 WL 1969289, at *2–3 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 24,
2020) (describing the settlement).
7 DL v. District of Columbia, 194 F. Supp. 3d 30, 48 (D.D.C. 2016), aff’d, 860 F.3d 713
(D.C. Cir. 2017); see also DL, 860 F.3d at 719 (affirming district court’s ruling).
8 E.g., Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions Over Time: A Case Study of Jail and
Prison Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550, 564 (2006); Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 270, 279 (1989).
9 Schlanger, supra note 8, at 564–66.
10 Id. at 554; see also Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra note 1, at 1411; Kathleen G. Noonan,
Jonathan C. Lipson &William H. Simon, Reforming Institutions: The Judicial Function in
Bankruptcy and Public Law Litigation, 94 IND. L.J. 545, 551–53 (2019); Charles F. Sabel &
William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 1016, 1021 (2004).
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indigent criminal defense systems has taken firm root, 11 and lawsuits
filed to address educational inequities that threaten children’s literacy
have met with success. 12
Institutional reform, however, has not sparked the deep scholarly
engagement it attracted fifty years ago. 13 Only a few commentators
have studied this litigation closely this century, and their work mostly
dates from its first decade. 14 This relative neglect has left almost
entirely unaddressed a key issue that these cases often raise. IR
jurisprudence has long emphasized broad, systemic remedies and how
courts craft and implement them as core matters for explication,
debate, and justification. 15 But unless a defendant agrees to a quick
settlement upon a case’s filing, these remedies will not issue if IR
plaintiffs cannot demonstrate standing, if a court will not certify a class,
and, obviously, if a case does not survive a motion to dismiss or for
summary judgment. These liability-phase matters depend in important measure on the makeup of the substantive rights the plaintiffs
allege.
Assessing the IR landscape in 1980, Theodore Eisenberg and
Stephen Yeazell recommended that the literature on institutional
reform place less emphasis on remedies and accept “[t]hat the merits
do . . . matter.” 16 I follow their suggestion, long neglected, and use this
11 Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Public Defense Litigation: An Overview, 51 IND. L. REV. 89, 94–
106 (2018) (describing this litigation through 2017).
12 Jennifer Chambers & Beth LeBlanc, Settlement for Detroit Literacy Lawsuit Eyes Nearly
$100M in Funding, DET. NEWS (May 14, 2020), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news
/local/michigan/2020/05/14/whitmer-announces-late-night-settlement-detroit-rightliteracy-case/5189089002/ [https://perma.cc/9F6M-LD6V]; Sonali Kohli & Iris Lee,
California Students Sued Because They Were Such Poor Readers. They Just Won $53 Million to Help
Them, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-02-20
/california-literacy-lawsuit-settlement-53-million [https://perma.cc/ZF4S-HWLY].
13 Schlanger, supra note 8, at 567 (describing a “sharp drop-off in scholarly interest”).
Prof. Schlanger described a “recent resurgence of scholarly interest” in 2006, but she cited
only three publications as evidence. Id. at 567–68 & n.64–68.
14 Notable works published over the past twenty years include: ROSS SANDLER & DAVID
SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN COURTS RUN GOVERNMENT
(2003); Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra note 1; Noonan et al., supra note 10; Parkin, supra note
1; Sabel & Simon, supra note 10; Schlanger, supra note 8; and David Zaring, National
Rulemaking Through Trial Courts: The Big Case and Institutional Reform, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1015
(2004). Prof. Schlanger has written a series of important articles on prison conditions
litigation. E.g., Margo Schlanger, Plata v. Brown and Realignment: Jails, Prisons, Courts, and
Politics, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 165 (2013). All but articles by Schlanger, Parkin, and
Noonan et al. date from 2006 or earlier.
15 E.g., PHILLIP J. COOPER, HARD JUDICIAL CHOICES: FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT JUDGES
AND STATE AND LOCAL OFFICIALS 331 (1988) (“Much of the discussion of remedial decree
cases jumps from the launching of suits to the crafting of remedies.”).
16 Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen C. Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in
Institutional Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465, 515–16 (1980).
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Article to offer a fundamental observation about the nature of the
substantive law that IR litigation often involves. Plaintiffs leverage a
variety of public law domains when they sue governments. But their
claims share a common characteristic. IR plaintiffs often allege violations of what are best described as group rights. Put differently, in a
number of doctrinal areas, the substantive law that determines
government liability for systemic maladministration often vests rights
in groups, not individuals.
An identification of group rights at institutional reform’s
substantive law core is important for historical, doctrinal, and
jurisprudential reasons. First, the evolution of a group rights jurisprudence further challenges the stubborn narrative of institutional
reform’s decline. The present-day existence of group rights in multiple public law domains has resulted from a long process of commonlaw elaboration and confirms this litigation’s entrenchment. Second,
conceptual clarity about rights design helps to resolve confusion that
has dogged efforts to adjudicate IR cases. This litigation can often
conflate what are really contests over whom the substantive law
protects and from what with procedural fights over matters like class
certification. Whether a class gets certified or an abstention motion
prevails should depend on the contours of the underlying substantive
law, but they often involve misguided procedural shadowboxing.
Third, the existence of group rights in a variety of public law
domains challenges the longstanding assumption that rights in “U.S.
constitutional and legal culture” are “essentially individualistic.”17 The
term “group rights” surfaces here and there in American public law
scholarship. But this literature tends to refer to rights for groups
recognized by some thick, socially determined, and often controversial
metric—religious ties, for instance, or a shared ethnic or racial
identity. 18 The group rights that IR plaintiffs commonly invoke come
from a variety of public law domains. They protect groups whose
members share nothing more than an interest in a public good, such

17 Mark Tushnet, The Critique of Rights, 47 SMU L. REV. 23, 26–27 (1993); cf. Kristen
A. Carpenter, Sonia K. Katyal & Angela R. Riley, In Defense of Property, 118 YALE L.J. 1022,
1052 n.130 (2009) (referring to “[t]he omission of groups (as distinct from individuals)
from dominant legal theory”); Jessica A. Clarke, Protected Class Gatekeeping, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV.
101, 141 (2017) (“American equality law . . . . does not envision social groups as the basic
units of analysis or the bearers of rights.”).
18 E.g., Kristen A. Carpenter & Eli Wald, Lawyering for Groups: The Case of American
Indian Tribal Attorneys, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3085, 3119 (2013) (tribes); Frederick Mark
Gedicks, Narrative Pluralism and Doctrinal Incoherence in Hosanna-Tabor, 64 MERCER L. REV.
405, 419 (2013) (religious groups); id. at 415 n.62 (citing literature on religious groups and
group rights).
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as the lawful administration of a government program or institution. 19
Once presumed to be “ideologically troublesome,” 20 group rights
actually exist without deep controversy—indeed, largely without
comment.
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, I situate my claim that
IR plaintiffs often allege group rights violations in this litigation’s
jurisprudential history. During institutional reform’s formative era
following Brown, leading voices in judicial and scholarly commentary
recognized that litigation brought by groups of inmates or school
children had implications for rights design. By the early 1980s, the
term “group rights” had begun to surface in important IR literature.
But flexibility in the procedural and remedial doctrines that governed
this litigation excused a close look at the substantive law’s makeup,
resulting in only modest jurisprudential engagement with rights
design.
Parts II and III are this Article’s core and make my case for the
existence of group rights. Onetime flexibility in the doctrines IR
litigation often involves has given way to rigor. But the administration
of these doctrines has not led to predicted results, particularly for IR
litigation’s procedural governance. In Part II, I show how a group
rights account can solve IR litigation’s procedural puzzle. If groups
litigate group rights, then administration of transsubstantive procedural doctrines makes sense, suggesting the existence of these rights
in an array of public law domains. Part III builds on this suggestion of
group rights’ existence and uses a case study to prove their existence.
In numerous jurisdictions, groups have successfully litigated broad
Sixth Amendment challenges to obtain significant reforms to
malfunctioning indigent criminal defense systems. These remedies
suggest something basic about rights design. I use leading public law
accounts of the rights-remedies relationship to show how differences
in individual and group Sixth Amendment remedies illuminate
differences in individual and group Sixth Amendment rights.
Part IV identifies jurisprudential and doctrinal implications of my
effort to excavate group rights. I offer a definition of group rights
distilled from the administration of procedural, substantive, and
remedial doctrines Parts II and III describe. A group right, I argue, is
19 This category corresponds to Joseph Raz’s “collective” conception of group rights.
JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 207–09 (1986); see also Peter Jones, Group Rights,
in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2016), https://plato
.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/rights-group/ [https://perma.cc/2MY9-QF4U].
Groups connected by a thicker, sociological determinant measure of identity correspond
better to the “corporate conception.” See Jones, supra. The two types of group rights I
discuss, then, have well-established analogues in political theory.
20 Tushnet, supra note 17, at 27.
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best known by the characteristics of judicial decisionmaking in cases
where groups of plaintiffs prove government liability without showings
of individualized harm to discrete victims, and where they win relief
that necessarily benefits groups and cannot aid individuals severally.
These twin characteristics of liability and remedy indivisibility
materialize not just when litigation proceeds to advantage or protect
groups recognized by some sort of socially determined metric. A
group right can also coalesce for instrumental reasons—when, given
the context, a group right best realizes the substantive law’s policies
and values. The law itself thus can constitute groups of people whose
connection is no thicker than a shared interest in improved
government performance.
Part IV also explains why conceptual clarity in descriptions of
rights matters to the day-to-day adjudication of IR cases. I use two
doctrinal hurdles these cases commonly encounter to show how
procedural wrangling can obscure more fundamental fights over
whom the substantive law protects and whether it works at the group
or individual level. Explicit engagement with rights design can ensure
that IR cases do not unjustly founder on procedural shoals.
This Article sings in a mostly descriptive key. Its task is to piece
together various doctrinal clues, first to prove that group rights exist
in various public law domains, and then to define what they are and
explain why their acknowledgment matters. The big normative questions must remain for future engagement. Should the substantive law
vest rights in groups? Under what circumstances and conditions? Are
courts institutionally equipped to make rights design choices? I
conclude by suggesting some lines of inquiry that an exercise seeking
answers to such questions might pursue.
I.

THE GROUP RIGHTS LINEAGE

The group rights that present-day IR plaintiffs invoke have
antecedents in canonical texts from this litigation’s formative era.
John Minor Wisdom’s magisterial Jefferson County opinion, issued in
1966, capped a decade of legal wrangling over desegregation and
rights design with a robust articulation of Fourteenth Amendment
group rights. 21 The next decade, Owen Fiss provided a landmark
account and defense of institutional reform that described this
litigation’s core features in group terms. He did not place rights
design at the center of his jurisprudence, but the doctrine then
governing this litigation’s procedural and remedial aspects did not
require detailed engagement with substance. The doctrinal landscape

21

United States v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966).
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has changed in ways that now force litigants and courts to articulate
the contours of rights with more precision. My account, then, has an
antecedent in Wisdom’s great achievement, and it updates Fiss’s
jurisprudence for a new doctrinal era.
A. Antecedents
1. Doctrine
After the Supreme Court decided Brown v. Board of Education, it
famously left the task of implementation to the lower federal courts. 22
This work included the fashioning of remedies to fix segregated
schools, but it also required lower courts to flesh out the Fourteenth
Amendment right whose contours the Court had left vague. 23 John
Parker, a Fourth Circuit judge, seized an early opportunity to craft
post-Brown doctrine in Briggs v. Elliott.24 There, he wrote that, after
Brown, “[t]he Constitution . . . does not require integration. It merely
forbids discrimination.” 25 Put differently, the Fourteenth Amendment
“merely forbids the use of governmental power to enforce
segregation” but does not require affirmative efforts to undo it. 26
Briggs gave southern governments legal cover to drain Brown of
any real significance. 27 Districts would leave black children in their
segregated schools, then ostensibly allow individual black children to
transfer if they wanted to do so. To vindicate her equal protection
right, a black child would have to apply to transfer, pursue this
application through various administrative channels the district
provided, and then file an individual lawsuit upon the application’s
inevitable denial. 28 Plaintiffs, litigating one-by-one, would never realize
Brown’s promise. The delays were too long, the legal resources too few,
and the threats to children who stepped forward too grave.
Wisdom, a legendary Fifth Circuit judge, responded to these
circumstances in United States v. Jefferson County. The problem with
Briggs, he insisted, was its “view that Fourteenth Amendment rights are
22 See e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 6 (1971).
23 See id.
24 Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955) (per curiam); John Minor
Wisdom, A Federal Judge in the Deep South: Random Observations, 35 S.C. L. REV. 503, 508
(1984). On the importance of Judge Parker’s interpretation of Brown for segregationists,
see Justin Driver, Supremacies and the Southern Manifesto, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1053, 1058, 1060,
1097–98 (2014).
25 Briggs, 132 F. Supp. At 777.
26 Id.
27 E.g., David Marcus, Flawed but Noble: Desegregation Litigation and Its Implications for
the Modern Class Action, 63 FLA. L. REV. 657, 683–85 (2011).
28 Id. at 684–85.
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exclusively individual rights . . . to be asserted individually.”29 But
“[s]egregation is a group phenomenon,” one “directed against the
group as a unit and against individuals only as their connection with
the group involves the antigroup sanction.” 30 The litigation of equal
protection claims does not place “[t]he peculiar rights of specific
individuals . . . in controversy,” but “the rights of Negro school
children as a class.” 31 Properly understood, Wisdom insisted, the right
is not to “be considered for admission to a white school” on an
individual basis. 32 It is a right held by all black children together to
have schools “reorganize[d] . . . into a unitary, nonracial system.” 33 A
Fourteenth Amendment violation had to be remedied accordingly,
with a group remedy.
2. Jurisprudence
If group rights’ doctrinal roots extend at least as far back as
Jefferson County, their scholarly lineage includes Fiss’s work in the late
1970s, the most important IR jurisprudence from this formative era.34
Fiss defended this litigation against the charge that it thrusts the judge
into a novel and inappropriate institutional role. 35 “Adjudication,” Fiss
argued, is and always has been “the social process by which judges give
meaning to our public values,” 36 or “an exercise of collective power . . .
to assure that social life conforms to the public values embodied in the
Constitution and other authoritative legal texts.” 37 Because the modern state acts through large-scale organizations to threaten these values
wholesale rather than individually, judges have to “restructur[e]”
organizations to “remove the threat” and thereby give public values
concrete meaning. 38 Institutional reform, then, represents the judici29 United States v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 864 (5th Cir. 1966).
30 Id. at 866 (quoting Comment, The Class Action Device in Antisegregation Cases, 20 U.
CHI. L. REV. 577, 577 (1953) (using “invokes” instead of “involves”)).
31 Id. at 870.
32 Id. at 845 (quoting Braxton v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 7 RACE RELS. L. REP. 675, 678
(S.D. Fla. 1962), aff’d 326 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1964) (putting quotes around “white”)).
33 Id. at 847.
34 The other landmark attempt at a jurisprudential synthesis from the era is Abram
Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976). See Daniel
A. Farber, Stretching the Adjudicative Paradigm: Another Look at Judicial Policy Making and the
Modern State, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 751, 757 (1999) (book review) (referring to Fiss and
Chayes as the two “[p]rophets of [the] [n]ew [p]aradigm”). I focus on Fiss because his
work encompassed more and extended throughout the decade.
35 Owen M. Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103, 1164 (1977).
36 Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term—Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 2 (1979).
37 Owen M. Fiss, The Bureaucratization of the Judiciary, 92 YALE L.J. 1442, 1461 (1983).
38 Fiss, supra note 36, at 17.
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ary’s evolutionary response to the modern scale of government harm,
an adjustment to settled judicial practice that “acknowledges the
bureaucratic character of the modern state.”39
Institutional reform does not change what litigation asked courts
to do. Rather, Fiss argued, its novelty involves the “implications for the
form of the lawsuit” that this core judicial task has. 40 He thus focused
his IR jurisprudence on procedural and remedial innovations. Both
contemplated the existence of groups as jural entities different from
their individual members. 41 The “party structure” of an IR lawsuit,
often a class action, reflects the fact that the alleged “victim . . . is not
an individual, but a group” 42—an entity that is “not simply an
aggregation or collection of identifiable individuals.” 43 This party
structure has remedial implications. For instance, the “risk of future
harm” requirement for an injunction “need not be satisfied” by the
threat to a specific individual but to “the victim group.” 44 Moreover,
because a remedy targets a large-scale organization “to remove the
condition that threatens the constitutional values,”45 “[t]he
beneficiary . . . is not an individual, or even a collection of identifiable
individuals,” but “a social group.”46
Fiss’s IR scholarship includes suggestions that rights, like
procedure and remedies, assume a group cast. 47 His nearly contemporaneous work on equal protection more directly engaged with rights
design. 48 Writing at a time of significant doctrinal upheaval, 49 Fiss
argued that equal protection does not protect against the classification

39 Id. at 2.
40 Id. at 17.
41 See OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 14–15 (1978).
42 Fiss, supra note 36, at 19, 21.
43 Id. at 19.
44 Id. at 20.
45 Id. at 27–28.
46 FISS, supra note 41, at 14; see also Fiss, supra note 36, at 19, 21.
47 See FISS, supra note 41, at 14–15 (referring to the “group character of the underlying
substantive claim”).
48 Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 107, 107–
08 (1976). Although he only gestured at the term, for decades commentators have described Fiss as advocating a “group rights” approach to Equal Protection. E.g., Robert G.
Dixon, Jr., Bakke: A Constitutional Analysis, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 69, 75, 75 n.19 (1979); David
A. Strauss, “Group Rights” and the Problem of Statistical Discrimination, ISSUES LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP, May 29, 2003, art. 17, at 7 (2003). But cf. Lawrence A. Alexander, Introduction:
Motivation and Constitutionality, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 925, 942 n.56 (1978) (noting the
conceptual ambiguity in Fiss’s treatment of equal protection and describing it as based
“either on a notion of group rights . . . or on more individualistic premises which remain
unstated and obscure”).
49 On the evolution of equal protection doctrine in the 1970s, see, e.g., Reva B. Siegel,
The Supreme Court 2012 Term—Foreword: Equality Divided, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1, 9–23 (2013).
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of individuals based on particular traits but against government
conduct that disadvantages certain groups. 50 Certain people (for Fiss,
chiefly black Americans) suffer subordination as a result of their group
identity, 51 creating caste systems. Equal protection, the law’s response,
responds by insisting on these systems’ dismantling. 52 What entitles an
individual to benefit from such a remedy is not his particular treatment
per se, but whether his treatment contributes to his group’s
subordination. 53
Fiss did not elaborate as extensively on the group nature of rights
in his IR jurisprudence. His defense of institutional reform worked
without this engagement. “Rights and remedies are but two phases of
a single social process,” Fiss argued, jointly contributing to the
meaning of the public value that a lawsuit realizes. 54 Remedies have
the same capacity as rights to express values, and, unlike rights, they
do so concretely and tangibly. Rights can therefore afford to “operate
in the realm of abstraction,” 55 Fiss insisted, without jeopardizing
adjudication’s capacity to discharge its core task. Fiss agreed that
procedure and remedies “should be[] ineluctably tied to the merits
and nature of the underlying substantive claim.” 56 But remedies do
not need to be “tailor[ed]” to the contours of rights. 57 Robust reservoirs of procedural flexibility and remedial discretion allow a remedy
to issue without precise delineation of a right’s four corners. 58
B. The Evolving Primacy of Rights Design
Others writing at the end of institutional reform’s foundational
era identified groups as important to rights design. In 1980, for
instance, Eisenberg and Yeazell emphasized “new rights of individuals
and groups” as IR litigation’s chief innovation. 59 Abram Chayes mentioned “the burgeoning of theories about groups (as opposed to
individuals) as right bearers” in 1982. 60 But the group rights thread

50 See Fiss, supra note 48, at 147, 153.
51 Id. at 150–52.
52 See id. at 150, 154–55.
53 See id. at 159–60.
54 Fiss, supra note 36, at 51–52.
55 Id. at 52.
56 FISS, supra note 41, at 94.
57 Fiss, supra note 36, at 46–49.
58 See id. at 49–50.
59 See Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 16, at 510 (emphasis added).
60 Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court 1981 Term—Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the
Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 27 (1982) (identifying these doctrines as central to
institutional reform’s governance). For an example from critical legal studies, see
Staughton Lynd, Communal Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1417 (1984).
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got dropped, and, as Morton Horwitz commented in 1988, American
“legal theory” remained “very resistant to recognizing group rights.”61
Changes to institutional reform’s doctrinal regulation since the
1970s have made a relative neglect of rights design no longer tenable.
Normative disagreement over the core of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s meaning forced clarity in Wisdom’s and Fiss’s
articulation of equal protection rights. Changes to the law regulating
standing, class certification, and remedies have had the same effect of
forcing attention to substance in a number of public law domains. 62
Increasingly since the 1970s, litigants and courts have had to justify
procedural and remedial decisions with claims about the contours of
the rights plaintiffs allege.
Fiss celebrated remedial discretion and critiqued what he called
the “tailoring principle,” or “the insistence that the remedy must fit
the violation.”63 During this era, Wendy Parker writes, “the Supreme
Court judged the scope of an injunction not just by the right-remedy
connection, but also according to the idea of equitable discretion.” 64
But the Supreme Court would grow “preoccup[ied]” with the
insistence that courts justify public law remedies by reference to the
right’s four corners. 65 By the end of the 1990s, Parker observes, the
Court had embraced “the right-remedy connection as the only
recognized measure of the scope of [an] injunction.” 66 Today, a
district court must match a remedy more formally to the contours of
the violated right. 67
Another doctrinal evolution involves standing. In 1985, Fiss
described the administration of standing doctrine in IR litigation as
“permissive.” 68 Few would characterize the doctrine similarly today. 69
Among other requirements, plaintiffs now must justify their standing
in terms of the content of the rights they allege defendants infringed. 70
61 Morton J. Horwitz, Rights, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393, 400–01 (1988); see also
Tushnet, supra note 17, at 26–27.
62 See Chayes, supra note 60, at 8.
63 Fiss, supra note 36, at 46–49.
64 Wendy Parker, The Supreme Court and Public Law Remedies: A Tale of Two Kansas
Cities, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 475, 524 (1999).
65 Chayes, supra note 60, at 47.
66 Parker, supra note 64, at 528.
67 Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996) (“The remedy must of course be limited
to the inadequacy that produced the injury in fact that the plaintiff has established.”(citing
Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 88, 89 (1995))); see also Schlanger, supra note 8, at 598.
68 Owen M. Fiss, The New Procedure, 54 REV. JURIDICA U. P.R. 209, 212 (1985).
69 See Heather Elliott, Standing Lessons: What We Can Learn When Conservative Plaintiffs
Lose Under Article III Standing Doctrine, 87 IND. L.J. 551, 558–62 (2012).
70 See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); Valley Forge Christian Coll.
v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982); Sabel &
Simon, supra note 10, at 1086; James Leonard & Joanne C. Brant, The Half-Open Door: Article
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In Lewis v. Casey, for instance, the Court commented extensively on the
contours of the constitutional right to access to the courts that a prison
system allegedly violated, determined that most of the systemic
injunctive relief the inmate plaintiffs sought was of no concern to the
right’s design, and thus concluded that most plaintiffs lacked the
requisite injury to support standing. 71
Finally, changes the Supreme Court has fashioned to class action
procedure over the past decade have forced litigants and courts to
justify joinder arguments in terms of substantive rights and their
contours. To determine that “there are questions of law or fact
common to the class,” as Rule 23’s commonality requirement demands, 72 the court must conclude after a “rigorous analysis” that the
defendant’s liability to each class member depends primarily on issues
determinable with legal arguments and evidence common to all. 73
This task requires precision in the articulation of the allegedly violated
right.
A recent foster care reform class action illustrates how changes to
these procedural and remedial doctrines force more precision in the
articulation of the contours of rights. In M.D. v. Perry, a class of
approximately 12,000 children alleged that various systemic
deficiencies in Texas’s long-term foster care system, including
inadequate caseworker resources and poor oversight, threatened them
with substantial harm in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 74
The district court certified the class in 2011, agreeing that the state’s
liability to all class members turned vaguely on answers to questions
like “whether Defendants’ actions in general caused harm or risk of
harm to Plaintiffs.” 75 Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court raised the
commonality threshold in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes. 76 The district
court’s analysis may have held up before Wal-Mart, the Fifth Circuit
acknowledged when it reversed the class certification decision in 2012.
But the district court failed to “understand the claims, defenses,

III, the Injury-in-Fact Rule, and the Framers’ Plan for Federal Courts of Limited Jurisdiction, 54
RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 111 (2001).
71 Lewis, 518 U.S. at 349–51.
72 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2).
73 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350–51 (2011) (quoting Gen. Tel. Co.
of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982)).
74 M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Perry, No. C–11–84, 2011 WL 2173673, at *1 (S.D. Tex.
June 2, 2011), certifying question to 799 F. Supp. 2d 712 (S.D. Tex. 2011), rev’d, 675 F.3d 832
(5th Cir. 2012).
75 Perry, 2011 WL 2173673, at *5.
76 Wal-Mart Stores, 564 U.S. at 338.
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relevant facts, and applicable substantive law” and justify class
certification in their terms. 77
On remand, the class certification fight boiled down to a dispute
over the Fourteenth Amendment right’s design. The plaintiffs’ proposed common questions of fact all focused on aggregate conduct and
risk of harm to children generally. 78 These questions failed “to address
any element of [the] Fourteenth Amendment claim,” the state agency
replied, 79 because its “‘individual-plaintiff-blind’ approach” did not
show how the adjudication of class members’ “truly individualized”
claims depended upon the agency’s general conduct toward all
children. 80 But “[l]iability depends on Defendants’ uniform course of
conduct toward all . . . [c]lass . . . members,” class counsel responded,
“not the individual circumstances of any particular child.” 81 The
district court agreed and explained why with an extensive discussion of
Fourteenth Amendment doctrine, what it required plaintiffs to prove
to prevail, and the common evidence the plaintiffs could use to
establish a prima facie case for all class members collectively. 82
“Defendants’ argument . . . mistakes the legal harm that is the basis of
the” class’s claim, the district court reasoned. The “unreasonable risk
of harm . . . alone is the legal injury,” and “actual harms suffered by
some class members [are] not constitutive” of it. 83 When the district
court ultimately ruled for the plaintiffs on the merits, it repeatedly
referred to “class members’ Fourteenth Amendment right” in the
singular. 84 The Fifth Circuit likewise referenced “plaintiffs’ right to be
free from a substantial risk of serious harm” when it upheld the second
class certification order and the merits decision. 85
The timing of doctrinal evolution makes sense of the relative
neglect of rights in Fiss’s group-oriented jurisprudence and explains
77 Perry, 675 F.3d at 841 (quoting McManus v. Fleetwood Enters., Inc., 320 F.3d 545,
548 (5th Cir. 2003)).
78 Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Class Certification and
Appointment of Class Counsel at 14–24, M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Perry, 294 F.R.D. 7 (S.D.
Tex. 2012) (No. 11–CV–84), 2012 WL 5305324.
79 Defendants’ Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification at 21,
Perry, 294 F.R.D. 7 (No. 11–CV–84), 2012 WL 13049817.
80 Id. at 40.
81 Plaintiffs’ Post-Hearing Brief in Support of Motion for Class Certification at 49,
Perry, 294 F.R.D. 7 (No. 11–CV–84), 2013 WL 1292636.
82 Perry, 294 F.R.D. at 31–36 (discussing the substance of Fourteenth Amendment
doctrine); id. at 38–45 (evaluating the class wide evidence the plaintiffs would adduce to
prove the violation).
83 Id. at 45.
84 M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Abbott, 152 F. Supp. 3d 684, 694 (S.D. Tex. 2015)
(emphasis added), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, vacated, 907 F.3d 237 (5th Cir. 2018); see also id.
at 697; id. at 828.
85 Abbott, 907 F.3d at 271 (emphasis added).
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why the literature on institutional reform dropped the group rights
thread decades ago. The substance-forcing changes to remedies,
standing, and class certification doctrine have happened gradually
over recent decades. 86 But, as I argue in the next Part, forthright
recognition of group rights is now necessary to explain important
aspects of IR litigation’s doctrinal governance. The next Part goes into
greater doctrinal detail to show how a group rights account makes the
most sense of this litigation’s procedural regulation.
II.

PROCEDURAL PUZZLES AND THE GROUP RIGHTS SOLUTION

In March 2012, fourteen class representatives sued the Arizona
Department of Corrections (DOC) on behalf of all inmates
incarcerated in the state’s prisons. 87 They brought a case much like
the one the Texas children litigated, challenging systemic deficiencies
in prison healthcare. These plaintiffs alleged that the defendants’
poor administration of Arizona’s ten prisons “subject[ed] all prisoners
to a substantial risk of serious harm” in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. 88 They sought an injunction to require the state to make
numerous improvements to healthcare provision. 89
The DOC moved to dismiss much of the complaint on standing
grounds. 90 In an ordinary lawsuit, a prisoner who suffers from one
inadequacy in prison healthcare does not have standing to challenge
other inadequacies that did not harm him. 91 The DOC argued that,
because none of the named plaintiffs had experienced many of the
complained-of inadequacies individually, they did not suffer the
required injury-in-fact for standing to challenge the full extent of the
alleged institutional failings.

86 On the timing of developments in class certification doctrine, see David Marcus,
The Persistence and Uncertain Future of the Public Interest Class Action, 24 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
395, 417 (2020).
87 Class Action Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 1, Parsons v. Ryan,
No. CV–12–601 (D. Ariz. filed Mar. 22, 2012) [hereinafter Class Action Complaint]. This
Part expands considerably on analyses of procedural doctrines in prior work. See Marcus,
supra note 86, at 421–25; David Marcus, The Public Interest Class Action, 104 GEO. L.J. 777,
811–21 (2016).
88 Class Action Complaint, supra note 87, at 2.
89 Id. at 73–74.
90 Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 5–7, Parsons v. Ryan, No. CV–12–601, 2014 WL
3887867 (D. Ariz. Aug. 7, 2014).
91 E.g., Caldwell v. Bentley, No. 11cv975, 2015 WL 1198608, at *6 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 16,
2015); Wishneski v. Doña Ana Cnty., No. CV 08-0348, 2009 WL 10708582, at *4 (D.N.M.
Feb. 19, 2009).

NDL203_MARCUS_03_23.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

634

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

3/23/2022 3:56 PM

[VOL. 97:2

The defense failed, 92 just as it has fizzled in a number of IR cases
over the past decade. 93 This futility is puzzling. Given standing doctrine’s increased rigor, especially as it has evolved since the 1970s, how
can IR plaintiffs sue to challenge and remedy inadequacies that do not
harm them individually? The answer, involving class certification and
preclusion doctrine, only begs more questions. If Arizona inmates
have different health needs and experience different deprivations at
different facilities, how do their Eighth Amendment claims raise
common questions of law or fact, as Rule 23’s newly strict commonality
requirement demands for class certification? Why doesn’t a class
judgment or settlement in an IR case preclude plaintiffs from litigating
valuable individual claims in subsequent cases?
No case can proceed unless the plaintiffs have standing. Most IR
cases proceed as class actions and require class certification. 94 Making
sense of these doctrines’ administration matters is not just important
for its own sake but also to ensure that this litigation can proceed when
it should. The procedural governance of IR litigation fits together in
a coherent whole if plaintiffs in many of these cases sue as groups
vindicating rights that protect them as such—as groups, that is, not as
discrete individuals.
A. The Standing Puzzle
The standing puzzle has its origins in two basic principles:
1. As a general matter, 95 a plaintiff “has standing to seek redress
for injuries done to him, but may not seek redress for injuries
done to others.”96
2. “[A] plaintiff’s remedy must be ‘limited to the inadequacy
that produced [his] injury in fact.’”97
This second principle follows as a remedial corollary of the first.
The first would lose its force if, after finding that a plaintiff has
92 See Parsons, 2014 WL 3887867, at *2–3.
93 E.g., Gayle v. Meade, 106 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 1595 (S.D. Fla. 2020); B.K. ex rel.
Tinsley v. Snyder, 922 F.3d 957, 966–67 (9th Cir. 2019); Braggs v. Dunn, 317 F.R.D. 634,
652–53 (M.D. Ala. 2016), certifying questions to 257 F. Supp. 3d 1171 (M.D. Ala. 2017); DL v.
District of Columbia, 302 F.R.D. 1, 19 (D.D.C. 2013), certifying questions to 194 F. Supp. 3d
(D.D.C. 2016), aff’d, 860 F.3d 713 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Brooklyn Ctr. for Indep. of the Disabled
v. Bloomberg, 290 F.R.D. 409, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), certifying questions to 980 F. Supp. 2d 588
(S.D.N.Y. 2013).
94 Marcus, supra note 87, at 783–84.
95 13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531.9
(3d ed. 2021), Westlaw FPP [hereinafter WRIGHT & MILLER].
96 Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 166 (1972). See also Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
97 Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1930 (2018) (quoting Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343,
357 (1996)) (alteration in original).

NDL203_MARCUS_03_23.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

3/23/2022 3:56 PM

GROUPS AND RIGHTS IN INSTITUTIONAL REFORM LITIGATION

635

standing to challenge certain of the defendant’s acts, the court could
enjoin other acts that did not injure the plaintiff. 98
A hypothetical, illustrated in Figure 1, explains how these
principles create a puzzle for litigation challenging government
policies and practices. 99 A state has five counties with a physician in
each who provides abortion services. The state passes a law that
requires these physicians to administer sonograms to all women
seeking abortions before proceeding. A physician who fails to comply
commits a misdemeanor. Dr. A, a physician in County A, sues on her
own to enjoin the statute’s enforcement. She surely has standing to
seek an injunction to bar County Attorney A from prosecuting her for
a violation. But the two standing principles mean that she cannot also
seek to enjoin County Attorney E from prosecuting Dr. E, the County
E physician. 100 Dr. A cannot litigate Dr. E’s injury, and an injunction
benefiting Drs. A and E would do more than necessary to remedy the
harm (the risk of criminal prosecution) to Dr. A. 101

98 See Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 494 (2009).
99 This hypothetical is based on a Texas law described in Texas Medical Providers
Performing Abortion Services v. Lakey, 806 F. Supp. 2d 942, 948 (W.D. Tex. 2011), vacated on
other grounds, 667 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 2012) (describing H.B. 15, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 342
(codified as amended at TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171 (West 2021))).
100 See Lakey, 806 F. Supp. 2d at 950–51; see also Summers, 555 U.S. at 494 (holding that
a plaintiff who has used one national forest lacks standing to challenge a government policy
enforced in another forest).
101 See Garnett v. Zeilinger, 301 F. Supp. 3d 199, 205 & n.4 (D.D.C. 2018).
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FIGURE 1: DR. A. V. COUNTY ATTORNEY A
State
Government

The solid arrows represent the
administration of centrally-adopted
abortion policy.

County
Attorney
A

County
Attorney
B

County
Attorney
C

County
Attorney
D

County
Attorney
E

Dr. A –
the sole
plaintiff

Dr. B

Dr. C

Dr. D

Dr. E

The dotted arrow represents the extent of
injunctive relief Dr. A could get if she sued
individually. Dr. A lacks standing to litigate Dr.
E’s injury, and an injunction does not need to
encompass anything more than County Attorney
A’s conduct to protect her.

The story changes if Dr. A brings a class action on behalf of all
physicians in the state. If her lawsuit succeeds, it can unquestionably
yield a statewide injunction, enjoining the statute’s enforcement in all
five counties, including County E. 102 Such class actions against stated,
uniform policies are legion. 103 But the fact “[t]hat a suit may be a class
action . . . adds nothing to the question of standing,” the Supreme
Court has repeatedly insisted: “[E]ven named plaintiffs who represent
a class ‘must allege and show that they personally have been injured,
not that injury has been suffered by other, unidentified members of
the class . . . .”104 If nothing alchemical happens just because Dr. A
sues as a class representative instead of as an individual plaintiff, how
can she win the statewide remedy consistent with the two standing
principles?

102 See Lakey, 806 F. Supp. 2d at 976–77. The Fifth Circuit reversed the Lakey district
court, but not on standing or remedial overbreadth grounds. Lakey, 667 F.3d at 584.
103 See Marcus, supra note 86, at 412–15 & n.74–89.
104 Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rts. Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40 n.20 (1976) (quoting Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 502 (1975)).
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1. Bundling Claims in Cases of Undifferentiated Conduct
This puzzle has an easy answer for cases challenging
undifferentiated conduct, or conduct directed at or experienced by
each class member uniformly. Figure 2 models this sort of case, one
the abortion hypothetical exemplifies. A “central agency” is responsible for the overall design and administration of a policy regime (here,
the law requiring sonograms before abortions). The central agency’s
conduct determines or at least affects the behavior of “bureaucratic
intermediaries” who administer policy regimes on the ground (here,
county prosecutors). A case involving undifferentiated conduct is one
where the challenged policy forged centrally remains unadjusted or
unaltered as the bureaucratic intermediaries administer it. The policy
regime’s “regulatory targets” or “regulatory beneficiaries” (here, the
physicians) experience the government’s conduct identically.
FIGURE 2: DR. A ET AL. V. STATE (CLASS ACTION)
State Government—
Central Agency
The solid arrows represent the
administration of centrally-adopted abortion
policy by bureaucratic intermediaries
(county attorneys)

County
Attorney
A

County
Attorney
B

County
Attorney
C

County
Attorney
D

County
Attorney
E

Dr. A

Dr. B

Dr. C

Dr. D

Dr. E

If each physician is joined as a plaintiff through class certification, each
physician would have standing to sue for an injunction directed at the
county attorney enforcing the statute against her (the dashed lines). The
sum of these individual injunctions equals an injunction against the
state policy in its entirety (the dotted line).
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If Dr. A and Dr. E sued together as co-plaintiffs in a non-class
lawsuit, the court would obviously have jurisdiction to enjoin the
statute’s enforcement in Counties A and E. The case would bundle
together Dr. A’s standing to sue for a County A injunction with Dr. E’s
standing to sue for a County E injunction. The only question would
be whether Dr. A could join Dr. E, a matter determined not by standing
doctrine but by one of the joinder rules in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Likewise, when a court grants class certification in Dr. A et
al. v. State, it joins all physicians providing abortion services, working
in all five counties, as parties. 105 Each one has standing to challenge
the statute’s enforcement against him or her. The sum of each class
member’s individual standing to seek an individually tailored injunction equals sufficient standing to authorize a single statewide
injunction to benefit all physicians at once. Nothing of functional
significance distinguishes five individual injunctions, each enjoining a
single county attorney, from a single injunction enjoining the law’s
enforcement statewide. The latter thus does not conflict with the two
standing principles.
Whether Dr. A can sue on behalf of physicians in all five counties,
then, depends on Rule 23, one of the Federal Rules’ joinder
provisions, and not on standing doctrine. The standing puzzle disappears. 106 Each alleged individual rights violation gives the court power
to enjoin a slice of the defendant’s action or policy. The class action
bundles the slices together to give the court power to target the central
agency with a sweeping injunction.
2. The Problem of Differentiated Conduct
This bundling solution to the standing puzzle fails when cases
involve differentiated conduct, defined as central agency policies,
customs, or actions that bureaucratic intermediaries change or alter
when they administer it for bureaucratic targets or beneficiaries.
These cases are institutional reform’s core. In the Arizona prison
healthcare case, for example, the central agency conduct the plaintiffs
targeted included statewide failures to provide adequate medication,
mental healthcare, and emergency medical training for staff. 107 This
maladministration, filtered through wardens and corrections officers

105 E.g., David Marcus & Will Ostrander, Class Actions, Jurisdiction, and Principle in
Doctrinal Design, 2019 BYU L. REV. 1511, 1541–42.
106 E.g., Langan v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Cos., Inc., 897 F.3d 88, 95 (2d Cir.
2018).
107 Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 664–67 (9th Cir. 2014).
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at different prisons (the bureaucratic intermediaries), materialized
differently for the different inmates (the regulatory targets). 108
If each Arizona inmate had sued on his or her own, the two
standing principles would have limited the discrete, individual
injunctions each one could have obtained, as Table 1 indicates. Prison
A officials’ liability to Inmate A has no bearing on the liability of
officials at Prisons B or C. The individual remedies, addressed to
bureaucratic intermediaries, are likewise independent of each other.
Inmate C gets no benefit, for instance, when Inmate A wins access to
skin cancer medication.
TABLE 1: INDIVIDUAL INMATE LAWSUITS FOR INDIVIDUAL INJUNCTIONS
Inmate Experience
Inmate A receives no
medication to
prevent recurrence
of skin cancer 109

Inmate B complains
of tooth pain, but
corrections officers
at Prison B do
nothing in
response 110
Inmate C, suffering
from gender
dysphoria, requests
but is refused sex
reassignment
surgery 111

Liability
Determination
Officials at Prison A
are deliberately
indifferent to Inmate
A’s health and
violate the Eighth
Amendment

Remedy

Injunction
requiring officials at
Prison A to send
Inmate A to an
oncologist and a
dermatologist, and
to provide Inmate A
with required
medication
Officials at Prison B
Injunction
are deliberately
requiring officials at
indifferent to Inmate Prison B to treat
B’s health and
Inmate B’s
violate the Eighth
toothache
Amendment
Officials at Prison C
Injunction
are deliberately
requiring officials at
indifferent to Inmate Prison C to make
C’s health and
sex reassignment
violate the Eighth
surgery available to
Amendment
Inmate C

108 See id. at 672.
109 This scenario comes from D’Amico v. Montoya, No. 15CV127, 2016 WL 4708950
(N.D. Fla. July 28, 2016).
110 This scenario comes from Chambers v. NH Prison, 562 F. Supp. 2d 197 (D.N.H.
2007).
111 This scenario comes from Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1164 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
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The Arizona prison healthcare litigation, by contrast, alleged a
systemic violation of inmates’ Eighth Amendment right to be free from
a substantial risk of serious harm. 112 Table 2 offers a stylized description of the litigation. Each inmate suffers the same harm as above, but
the case alleges these harms as illustrations of the risk of harm that
systemic maladministration state-wide creates for all inmates.
TABLE 2: GROUP PRISON CONDITIONS LAWSUIT FOR A SYSTEMIC
INJUNCTION
Inmate Experience
Inmate A receives
no medication to
prevent recurrence
of skin cancer
Inmate B complains
of tooth pain, but
corrections officers
at Prison B do
nothing in response
Inmate C, suffering
from gender
dysphoria, requests
but is refused sex
reassignment
surgery

Liability
Determination
The Department of
Corrections’
customs, policies,
and practices for the
management of
prison healthcare
state-wide expose all
inmates to a
substantial risk of
serious harm in
violation of the
Eighth Amendment.

Remedy
Injunction requiring
DOC to make
systemic
improvements, by
obtaining increased
funding, improving
medical records,
putting an
independent
monitoring system in
place, hiring more
and better
healthcare providers,
and other changes to
central agency policy
administration.

The DOC’s liability depended on a determination with regard to
the class as a whole and not individual inmates. 113 This liability determination was indivisible, meaning that the court could not adjudicate
the wrongdoing any one inmate allegedly suffered without doing so
for all inmates at once. The class settled for sweeping relief to force
the DOC to make systemic improvements. 114 A vast gulf divides the
individual injunctions described in Table 1 from the single remedy
aimed at the central agency that Table 2 describes. The former are
divisible. An injunction can protect a single inmate while leaving the
112 Parsons, 754 F.3d at 676.
113 Id. at 678.
114 Exhibit B to Stipulation at 7, Parsons v. Ryan, No. CV–12–601 (D. Ariz. filed Oct.
14, 2014) (document number 1185–1 filed the day before notice of settlement).
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others’ remedial experience unchanged. The latter, like the liability
determination, is indivisible. The fundamental changes the systemic
injunction orders to central agency policy administration necessarily
benefit all inmates together.
I pause briefly to highlight liability and remedy indivisibility. They
are key definitional traits of group rights. I discuss them further in
Part IV.
3. Class Certification and Preclusion Issues
Arguably, the bundling solution to the standing puzzle can work
in cases of differentiated conduct if each inmate is entitled to his own
individual slice of the systemic injunction. After all, discrete injuries
to individual Arizona inmates ultimately result from systemic
institutional flaws that mar the DOC’s performance. Inmate A might
benefit more directly from an injunction ordering that the prison give
him cancer medication. But he might pursue more indirect individualized relief instead—perhaps an order requiring the prison system to
maintain better health records for him, to get more funding to
purchase the medication he needs, and to put oversight mechanisms
in place to ensure that he does not go without skin cancer treatment
any further. 115

115 Cf. Tracy A. Thomas, The Prophylactic Remedy: Normative Principles and Definitional
Parameters of Broad Injunctive Relief, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 301, 316–17 (2004); id. at 352–54
(commenting on equitable discretion and formulating injunctions).
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TABLE 3: INDIVIDUAL INMATE LAWSUITS FOR DIVISIBLE INDIRECT
INJUNCTIONS
Inmate
Experience
Inmate A
receives no
medication to
prevent
recurrence of
skin cancer

Liability
Determination
Officials at Prison
A are deliberately
indifferent to
Inmate A’s health
and violate the
Eighth
Amendment.

Inmate B
complains of
tooth pain, but
corrections
officers at Prison
B do nothing in
response

Officials at Prison
B are deliberately
indifferent to
Inmate B’s health
and violate the
Eighth
Amendment

Inmate C,
suffering from
gender
dysphoria,
requests but is
refused sex
reassignment
surgery

Officials at Prison
C are deliberately
indifferent to
Inmate C’s health
and violate the
Eighth
Amendment

Remedy
Direct injunction: injunction
requiring officials at Prison A
to send Inmate A to an
oncologist and a
dermatologist, and to provide
Inmate A with required
medication
Indirect substitute: injunction
requiring officials at Prison A
to maintain better medical
records for Inmate A, to get
more funding to purchase
the medication he needs, etc.
Direct injunction: injunction
requiring officials at Prison B
to treat Inmate B’s toothache
Indirect substitute: injunction
requiring officials at Prison B
to maintain better medical
records for Inmate B, to get
more funding to provide the
treatment he needs, etc.
Direct injunction: injunction
requiring officials at Prison C
to make sex reassignment
surgery available to Inmate C
Indirect substitute: injunction
requiring officials at Prison C
to maintain better medical
records for Inmate C, to get
more funding to provide the
treatment she needs, etc.

The class action would add together all of the individual claims and
generate a bundle of indirect substitutes as each inmate’s remedy. An
indivisible injunction requiring statewide improvements in medical
record-keeping, funding, and oversight would be the functional
equivalent of this bundle of divisible remedies and thus could issue
without violating the two standing principles.
This substitution of the indirect injunction for the direct solves
the standing puzzle, but it creates two class certification problems. The
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first involves Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement. Seeking an
injunction requiring better record-keeping, for instance, Inmate A
would have to make a showing connecting poor record-keeping at his
facility to his particular harm. 116 The claims of Inmates B and C would
require similar discrete showings of causation. The defendants’
liability to the class would thus depend on individualized determinations of fact and law. Resolution of questions common to the class,
such as “does the state have an adequate system for medical records,”
would not “drive the resolution” of all class members’ claims, as
commonality requires. 117
The second class certification problem implicates preclusion
doctrine. By pursuing the indirect injunctions instead of the direct
ones, the class representative has standing to sue for the indivisible
equivalent of this remedies bundle. But a class representative who
proposes to eschew valuable remedies potentially available to
individual class members to make a class certifiable may fail an
adequacy of representation test. 118 As a general matter, class members
are parties for the purposes of preclusion, and thus a class judgment
has claim preclusive effects for all class members. 119 Under standard
preclusion doctrine, a party who asserts one claim for relief arising
from a transaction or occurrence must assert all such claims or be
precluded from doing so in future litigation. 120 If a class representative
brings only claims for indirect remedies on behalf of the class, the
preclusive effect of the class judgment or settlement jeopardizes class
members’ claims for the individualized, direct remedies. The class
representative’s claim for better overall record-keeping, for instance,
might jeopardize another inmate’s individual claim for an order
requiring the prison to provide him immediate dental care.
Muddled doctrine makes highly uncertain the actual preclusive
effects of class judgments or settlements for individualized claims
plaintiffs cannot join in a class action. 121 But one tension points toward
116 Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996).
117 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011) (quoting Richard A.
Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 132 (2009)).
118 See McClain v. Lufkin Indus., Inc., 519 F.3d 264, 283 (5th Cir. 2008); Robert H.
Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 781 (2013).
119 See e.g., Giannone v. York Tape & Label, Inc., 548 F.3d 191, 193–94 (2d Cir. 2008);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 25 cmt. f (AM. L. INST. 1982).
120 E.g., Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 789 F.2d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 1986).
121 Tobias Barrington Wolff, Preclusion in Class Action Litigation,105 COLUM. L. REV.
717, 743–44 (2005). Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 881 (1984), an
employment discrimination case, seems to endorse a preclusion exception for class
members’ claims whose joinder in the class action would prevent certification by
introducing too many individual issues. This exception is warranted, the Court explained,
in part to preserve the class action’s capacity “to provide a mechanism for the expeditious
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a principled doctrinal untangling, at least for IR cases. In numerous
instances courts have held that settlements in money damages class actions can preclude individualized claims, even “inherently individual”
claims that “could not have been brought in the class action,” provided
class members had notice of the settlement’s breadth and a right to
opt out. 122 By contrast, a class judgment or settlement in an injunctive
relief case most likely cannot preclude individual class members from
pursuing individualized injunctive relief in subsequent litigation. 123
What explains the difference?
B. Group Rights and Doctrinal Fit
An understanding that IR plaintiffs sue not as assemblages of
individuals but as groups vindicating rights benefiting them as such
provides a ready answer. It also solves the standing puzzle in cases of
differentiated conduct, and it makes sense of the administration of
class certification doctrine. Table 4 summarizes the procedural problems IR litigation poses and shows how a single explanation—groups
litigate group rights—fits all of these pieces together.

decision of common questions.” Id. at 881 (emphasis omitted). As Professor Wolff
explains, the Cooper court primarily based this exception on Title VII doctrine. It has not
generated a single, transsubstantive preclusion exception. Wolff, supra, at 730. But see 6
WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 18:17 (5th ed. 2021), Westlaw
CLASSACT (reading Cooper more broadly).
122 See Thompson v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 992 F.2d 187, 190–91 (8th Cir. 1993); see
also Thomas v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass’n, 333 F. App’x 414, 419–20 (11th Cir. 2009);
Gonzalez v. City of New York, 396 F. Supp. 2d 411, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
123 See, e.g., Pride v. Correa, 719 F.3d 1130, 1137 (9th Cir. 2013); Akootchook v. United
States, 271 F.3d 1160, 1164–65 (9th Cir. 2001); Cameron v. Tomes, 990 F.2d 14, 18 (1st Cir.
1993); Fortner v. Thomas, 983 F.2d 1024, 1031 (11th Cir. 1993); Watson v. Sisto, No. 7–CV–
1871, 2011 WL 533716, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2011), adopted, No. 7–CV–1871, 2011 WL
1219298 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2011); Burnett v. Dugan, 618 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1237 (S.D. Cal.
2009). But see Harper v. Thomas, 988 F.2d 101, 104 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding that a prior
class settlement bars a class member’s claim for individualized injunctive relief but not
money damages). Before the Ninth Circuit decided Pride, district courts within California
split on this preclusion exception. For courts that rejected it, see, e.g., Tilei v. Cal. Dep’t of
Corr. & Rehab., No. C 12-1688, 2012 WL 12953766, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2012), aff’d in
part, vacated in part, 644 F. App’x 758 (9th Cir. 2016); Ortiz v. Reynolds, No. 10–CV–1380,
2012 WL 2521994, at *4 (E.D. Cal. June 28, 2012), adopted, 10–CV–1380, 2012 WL 4364143
(E.D. Cal. Sep. 21, 2012); Gonzalez v. Runnels, No. C 7-2303, 2009 WL 10710478, at *5
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2009).
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TABLE 4: THE GROUP RIGHTS SOLUTION TO PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS IN
IR LITIGATION
Procedural
Issue
Standing

Class
Certification

Preclusion

Problem

Solution

How does an
individual class
representative who
does not personally
suffer harmful effects
from every aspect of
the central agency’s
misconduct have
standing to challenge
its full scope?
How does a claim
raised by one class
member for the harm
she experiences share
common questions of
law or fact with
another class member
who suffers a different
harm?

The class representative
does not sue as an
individual but as a group
member, on behalf of the
group. The group as a
whole suffers harm from
the full scope of the
maladministration and has
standing to remedy it.

Why doesn’t the
judgment or
settlement obtained in
an injunctive relief
class action preclude
class members from
litigating individual
injunctive relief claims
against the
government defendant
in subsequent
individual lawsuits?

The class members litigate
as group members,
alleging a violation of the
group right they share to
be free from a substantial
risk of serious harm. The
defendant’s liability
depends on central agency
conduct toward all group
members, not how the risk
materializes for particular
members.
The class members sue in
their jural capacities as
group members, not as
individuals. They are not
parties in their individual
capacities. When they sue
in subsequent individual
lawsuits, they do so as
individuals, and thus as
different parties litigating
different claims.
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1. Preclusion and Standing
A group rights account makes quick work of the preclusion
exception in injunctive relief cases that excuse claims for
individualized injunctive relief from the preclusive effects of a class
judgment. In most instances, “[a] court’s judgment binds only the
parties to a suit.” 124 A derivative action brought to vindicate a
corporation’s rights does not bind individual shareholders. Individual
shareholders are different jural entities from the corporations they
own and thus are not parties to the derivative action. 125 The same logic
obtains in an IR case. If class members do not litigate in their jural
capacities as individuals but instead as members of a group, then
individual class members qua individuals are not parties to the class
action. The class judgment or settlement cannot preclude class members if they bring individualized injunctive relief claims in subsequent
litigation.
Group rights also solve the standing puzzle. In recent years, courts
adjudicating IR cases involving a range of public law domains have
come to understand the alleged injury as the exposure of a vulnerable
population to a risk of serious harm. 126 Specific, concrete harms that
individual members of the group suffer can illustrate how the risk
manifests. But the systemic risk that all group members endure, not
these specific harms, constitutes the alleged rights violation. 127
When plaintiffs allege a risk of harm as their injury, they litigate a
group right. In my diagram’s parlance, a risk of harm claim conceives
of the violated right as the central agency’s failure to administer a
policy regime, such as the Arizona DOC’s healthcare failures,
competently. The defendant’s liability thus turns entirely on central
agency conduct and can only be determined indivisibly. Whatever
bureaucratic intermediaries like wardens do or do not do has no
determinative relevance for the defendant’s liability. In effect, the
conduct of bureaucratic intermediaries loses legal significance except
124 Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299, 312 (2011) (citing 18A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra
note 95, § 4449); see also Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 893–95 (2008) (describing
exceptions).
125 7C WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 95, § 1840.
126 E.g., B.K. ex rel. Tinsley v. Snyder, 922 F.3d 957, 968–69 (9th Cir. 2019); Parsons v.
Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 681 (9th Cir. 2014); Savino v. Souza, 453 F. Supp. 3d 441, 451 (D. Mass.
2020), certifying questions to 459 F. Supp. 3d 317 (D. Mass. May 12, 2020); J.P. v. Sessions, No.
CV18–6081, 2019 WL 6723686, at *20 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2019); Blake v. City of Grants Pass,
No. 18–CV–1823, 2019 WL 3717800, at *5 (D. Or. Aug. 7, 2019), certifying questions to No.
18–CV–1823, 2020 WL 4209227 (D. Or. July 22, 2020); Cain v. City of New Orleans, 327
F.R.D. 111, 125 (E.D. La. 2018); Kenneth R. ex rel. Tri-Cnty. Cap, Inc. v. Hassan, 293 F.R.D.
254, 267 (D.N.H. 2013).
127 E.g., Braggs v. Dunn, 317 F.R.D. 634, 657 (M.D. Ala. 2016).
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to illustrate how the central agency’s policy maladministration creates
a risk of harm. Likewise the identities and circumstances of individual
regulatory targets or regulatory beneficiaries do not matter to a determination of the defendant’s liability. The central agency does not
differentiate among members of the group as it administers the policy
regime. Whether it creates an intolerable risk of harm thus depends
on the impact of central agency conduct on the group as a whole. 128
Thus the court determines the defendant’s liability with aggregate,
indivisible findings, not individual ones.
FIGURE 3: GROUP RIGHTS AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Arizona Dep’t
of Corrections

The downward-sloping solid line represents
the risk of harm the central agency’s conduct
creates for the group. The upward-sloping
solid line represents a systemic injunction
matched to what is necessary to reduce this
overall risk.

Officials at
Prison A

Officials at
Prison B

Officials at
Prison C

The officials at the different
prisons (bureaucratic
intermediaries) disappear as
legally irrelevant to the Arizona
DOC’s liability for the group
right’s violation.
Individual inmates with different
health care needs recede as legally
significant. The group, not
individuals within it, is the jurally
relevant litigant. Individual
circumstances do not determine the
defendant’s liability.

Inmates in Arizona
prisons at risk of harm
(the plaintiff group)

A “risk of harm” case presents no standing puzzle at all. The two
standing principles limit a plaintiff’s standing to seek redress for
injuries done to her and not others, and they limit the remedy to what
is necessary to redress the injury. A group of undifferentiated members alleges the risk of harm claim, arguing that central agency policy
maladministration in all its aspects injures the group as a whole by
128

DG ex rel. Stricklin v. DeVaughn, 594 F.3d 1188, 1198 (10th Cir. 2010).
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creating a generic risk of harm. The group thus has standing to
challenge the entirety of the central agency’s conduct. The injunction
redresses the group-wide risk of harm that the central agency’s
maladministration creates and no more. There is no need to bundle
individual claims together to justify a class-wide remedy, and there is
no concern for the preclusive effects of a judgment on individualized
first-best claims. For the group, the structural systemic injunction
targeting the central agency’s customs, policies, and practices is the
most direct remedy.
2. Class Certification
Finally, a group rights account makes sense of the administration
of class action doctrine in IR cases. Following Wal-Mart, courts administering Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement require plaintiffs to
show, often with evidence, how all class members’ claims raise
questions of law or fact that can generate common answers apt to drive
the resolution of each one’s claim. 129 An Arizona inmate suing in his
individual capacity and trying to establish DOC’s deliberate
indifference based on its failure to give him emergency dental
treatment would have to marshal evidence about his requests, how
corrections officers at his prison responded, and so forth—all
individualized matters, the resolution of which would have no bearing
on any other inmate’s claim. Interpreting Rule 23(b)(2), Wal-Mart
also requires class members to show how a single “indivisible” remedy
can benefit all of them together. 130 If each inmate seeks an individualized injunction for her discrete harm, the proposed class would fail
Rule 23(b)(2).
Courts took a casual approach to class certification in IR litigation
before Wal-Mart. If class members litigate individual rights violations,
one would have expected a dramatic decline in the certification of IR
classes after the decision. But courts continue to certify these classes
at a robust clip. 131 A group rights account explains why. The group
has a right to competent central agency policy administration. 132 The
substantive law, then, makes the defendants’ liability turn exclusively
on the lawfulness of central agency conduct, which all class members
have in common.
The plaintiffs’ case for liability poses no

129 Marcus, supra note 86, at 419–20.
130 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 360 (2011) (quoting Nagareda, supra
note 117, at 132).
131 Marcus, supra note 86, at 398–99.
132 For a rich development of an idea related to that expressed here, see Charles F.
Sabel & William H. Simon, The Duty of Responsible Administration and the Problem of Police
Accountability, 33 YALE J. ON REGUL. 165 (2016).
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commonality problem. A single, class-wide injunction directly responds to this indivisible conduct, meeting Rule 23(b)(2)’s demand
for indivisible relief. The violation of a group right does not just allow
but requires group-wide adjudication and a group-wide remedy.
*

*

*

Other reasons might explain why IR plaintiffs do not routinely
lose on standing grounds, why courts routinely grant class certification
motions in these cases, and what accounts for the peculiar
administration of preclusion doctrine in them. These alternatives may
have nothing to do with each other and still be plausible. A group
rights account, however, makes all of the procedural pieces fit together
in a coherent whole. If groups litigate group rights, then the administration of procedural doctrine in IR litigation, even in an era of
increased rigor, makes perfect sense.
III.

THE SUBSTANCE OF GROUP RIGHTS: THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT EXAMPLE

But do group rights really exist? IR plaintiffs are inmates, children
in foster care, people with mobility impairments, indigent criminal
defendants, and other individuals with no connection more formal
than the fact that they happen to share a similar relationship with a
government institution. Each one has his or her own set of individual
rights. The claim that they inhabit a different jural identity may
smooth over some procedural wrinkles, but it smacks of transcendental
nonsense. Liability determinations and remedies may be indivisible,
but do these traits really suggest something about rights design?
Proving the existence of group rights may seem an impossible
challenge. After all, a “right is a concept, not a thing.” 133 It is difficult
to describe in objective, empirically verifiable ways. But remedies are
concrete and identifiable, and they relate to rights in ways that can
illuminate the latter’s design. Procedure suggests the existence of
group rights. Remedies can lay bare the real, tangible distinction
between individual and group rights.
This Part uses a case study to show how remedies illuminate rights
design. Most Sixth Amendment adjudication happens when individual
criminal defendants seek to vacate convictions or sentences after a
guilty plea or trial. But a fledging species of IR litigation has yielded
Sixth Amendment adjudication of a different sort. Groups of indigent
criminal defendants have brought class actions to win systemic changes
133 Stephen A. Smith, Rights and Remedies: A Complex Relationship, in TAKING REMEDIES
SERIOUSLY 31, 36 (Kent Roach & Robert J. Sharpe eds., 2009).
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to poorly funded, badly administered indigent defense systems. As did
the Arizona inmates in the litigation described in Part II, these groups
argue for the defendant’s liability in indivisible terms. Similarly, these
groups seek indivisible remedies, such as better funding for indigent
defense or caps on lawyer caseloads. Indigent criminal defendants
suing as classes assert group Sixth Amendment rights. Differences
between individual postconviction remedies and systemic, class-wide
remedies can prove this so.
A. The Sixth Amendment in Individual and Group Litigation
1. Individual Sixth Amendment Remedies
The Sixth Amendment guarantees not just the right to appointed
counsel for indigent criminal defendants, as Gideon v. Wainwright
famously extended, but also this counsel’s effective assistance. 134
Strickland v. Washington and United States v. Cronic provide the doctrine
that individual criminal defendants follow when they try to vindicate
this right. 135 The decisions treat the right to effective assistance as a
means to ensure acceptably accurate outcomes. 136 For this reason,
criminal defendants do not have a right to lawyer performance that
measures up by some metric of competence or professionalism. 137
Rather, “[t]he benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness
must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper
functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on
as having produced a just result.” 138
This emphasis on outcome accuracy has implications for the
burden an individual criminal defendant bears to establish a Sixth
Amendment violation. Obviously, “the defendant must show that
counsel’s performance was deficient.” 139 But poor lawyer performance
alone isn’t enough. As the Strickland court declared, “the defendant
must [also] show that the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense.” 140 In other words, a “counsel’s errors” must be “so serious
as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is

134 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,
467 (1938); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 11.7(a) (4th ed. 2004).
135 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S.
648 (1984).
136 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691–92; Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658.
137 See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 134, § 11.7(a).
138 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686.
139 Id. at 687.
140 Id.
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reliable.”141 To establish this showing of prejudice, a defendant must
overcome a “‘strong presumption’ that counsel’s conduct falls within
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” 142 Cronic crafted
a “narrow exception” to the prejudice requirement, 143 presuming a
“constructive denial” of counsel altogether under particularly extreme
circumstances. 144
Strickland’s prejudice requirement means that a Sixth
Amendment violation only ripens after the prosecution’s conclusion. 145 This conception of the right has remedial consequences.
Individual criminal defendants can almost never raise Sixth
Amendment claims preconviction. 146 They therefore almost invariably
pursue their rights in postconviction proceedings, either direct
appeals or collateral challenges. 147 For this reason, a court remedies
an individual’s Sixth Amendment violation by vacating his
conviction. 148
A court adjudicating an individual Sixth Amendment challenge
makes a divisible liability determination. Strickland and Cronic contemplate individual criminal defendants showing one-by-one how their
lawyers’ missteps prejudiced outcomes. 149 Likewise, the remedy is
divisible. When a court vacates one defendant’s conviction, the
remedy has no formal implications for any other defendant.

141 Id.
142 Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 702 (2002) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).
143 Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 124 (2008) (per curiam) (quoting Florida v.
Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 190 (2004)).
144 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692 (citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 & n.25
(1984)).
145 E.g., United States v. Carmichael, 372 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1333 (M.D. Ala. 2005).
146 Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Reclaiming Equality to Reframe Indigent Defense Reform, 97
MINN. L. REV. 1197, 1216 (2013); 43A C.J.S. Injunctions § 304 (2021). But see State v. Young,
172 P.3d 138 (N.M. 2007) (addressing a Sixth Amendment challenge to the adequacy of
public defender resources before conviction); Dalton v. Barrett, No. 17–CV–4057, 2019 WL
954982, at *6 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 26, 2019) (denying class certification in a systemic challenge
to the adequacy of an indigent defense system in part because “[p]laintiffs . . . could bring
their claims” challenging the system “individually . . . and obtain an individual injunction,”
but providing no authority for this assertion).
147 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 134, § 11.7(e); see also United States v. Triplett, 104 F.3d
1074, 1083 (8th Cir. 1997); Yarls v. Bunton, 231 F. Supp. 3d 128, 132 (M.D. La. 2017).
148 E.g., United States v. Young, 315 F.3d 911, 915 (8th Cir. 2003).
149 Osagiede v. United States, 543 F.3d 399, 408 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000)) (referring to the Strickland inquiry as entailing an
“individualized fact-based analysis”); United States v. Rashad, 331 F.3d 908, 909 (D.C. Cir.
2003) (referring to the “fact-intensive” Strickland inquiry).
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2. Systemic Sixth Amendment Remedies
Challenges to individual convictions are woefully out-of-sync with
the scale of the American indigent defense crisis. 150 Badly underfunded systems across the country struggle to provide even the barest
minimum of representation. 151 Overworked attorneys staggering
under the weight of enormous caseloads cannot investigate cases or
even review discovery materials. They cannot meet with clients except
immediately before hearings and even trial. They have almost nonexistent investigator and training resources, and they cannot provide
conflict-free representation. 152 Ineffective assistance is standard
operating procedure for the many systems afflicted with these sorts of
problems. 153 A vast gulf divides the values and policies in the Sixth
Amendment and Gideon, on one hand, and lived realities for many
criminal defendants, on the other.
In a couple of cases decades ago, individual criminal defendants
attempted to leverage these systemic deficiencies in the service of their
individual Sixth Amendment claims. 154 In one instance, the Arizona
Supreme Court held that a badly overburdened indigent defense
system created a rebuttable presumption of ineffective assistance,
effectively flipping the Strickland burden from the defendant to the
state. 155 But this sort of intervention proved ineffective at galvanizing
systemic reform, in part because these early efforts still required
individuals to litigate their rights in one-by-one postconviction
challenges. 156
Starting in the 1990s, but accelerating quickly over the past fifteen
years, impact litigators have launched wholesale challenges to

150 See Martin Guggenheim, The People’s Right to a Well-Funded Indigent Defender System,
36 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 395, 401–05 (2012).
151 E.g., Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases: Still a
National Crisis?, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1564, 1578–89 (2018); NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNS.
COMM., CONST. PROJECT, JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA’S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL xi-xii (2009) [hereinafter JUSTICE DENIED].
152 E.g., Kuren v. Luzerne Cnty., 146 A.3d 715, 723–25 (Pa. 2016); Pub. Def., Eleventh
Jud. Cir. of Fla. v. State, 115 So. 3d 261, 278 (Fla. 2013).
153 David Rudovsky, Gideon and the Effective Assistance of Counsel: The Rhetoric and the
Reality, 32 LAW & INEQUALITY 371, 372 (2014) (citing JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 151, at 2–
7).
154 Cara H. Drinan, The Third Generation of Indigent Defense Litigation, 33 N.Y.U. L. REV.
L. & SOC. CHANGE 427, 436–39 (2009).
155 State v. Smith, 681 P.2d 1374, 1384 (Ariz. 1984); see also State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d
780, 791 (La. 1993).
156 Note, Effectively Ineffective: The Failure of Courts to Address Underfunded Indigent Defense
Systems, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1741–42 (2005).
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dysfunctional indigent defense systems. 157 Plaintiffs in these class
actions typically sue on behalf of “fluid” classes of indigent criminal
defendants being or to be prosecuted. 158 They bring what the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court labeled a “structural claim,” as
distinguished from an “individual one.” 159 Class representatives typically allege that systemic deficiencies in the indigent defense system at
issue create the “considerable risk that indigent defendants are, with a
fair degree of regularity, being denied constitutionally mandated
counsel.” 160 These cases “make no individual claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel.” 161 Rather, they seek aggregate-level remedies
for systemic deficiencies that degrade the quality of representation that
all indigent defendants experience. 162
157 Lucas, supra note 11, at 96–98 & n. 44–55 (listing cases and outcomes current
through March 2017); see also Drinan, supra note 154, at 439–62. I focus on cases
challenging indigent defense systems that formally provide counsel, not ones that fail to
provide any counsel at all. Cf. Lavallee v. Justs. in the Hampden Superior Ct., 812 N.E.2d
895 (Mass. 2004). Most of these lawsuits proceed in state court due to Younger abstention
and other doctrines. E.g., Luckey v. Miller, 976 F.2d 673, 677–78 (11th Cir. 1992); Yarls v.
Bunton, 231 F. Supp. 3d 128, 132 (M.D. La. 2017). Compare Justin Murray, Prejudice-Based
Rights in Criminal Procedure, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 277, 304 (2020) (using a federal case as
“representative” to support the claim that “courts generally leave prospective ineffective
assistance claimants empty-handed”), with Lucas, supra note 11, at 106 (noting that most of
these cases proceed in state court).
158 Duncan v. State, 774 N.W.2d 89, 125, 141 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009), aff’d on other
grounds, 866 N.W.2d 407 (Mich. 2010); Lucas, supra note 11, at 93; Drinan, supra note 154,
at 444–45. In several instances over the past decade, public defenders or counties
responsible for providing indigent defense resources themselves have served as plaintiffs or
the equivalents. These are effectively representative actions. The litigant is not an individual criminal defendant but rather a lawyer or county claiming that he, she, or it cannot
adequately provide defense services to all indigent defendants. See Pub. Def., Eleventh Jud.
Cir. of Fla. v. State, 115 So. 3d 261 (Fla. 2013); Quitman Cnty. v. State, 910 So. 2d 1032
(Miss. 2005).
159 Kuren v. Luzerne Cnty., 146 A.3d 715, 746 (Pa. 2016); see also id. at 736 (insisting
that the plaintiffs “make no individual claims” and instead “challenge the system itself”).
160 Hurrell-Harring v. State, 930 N.E.2d 217, 227 (N.Y. 2010); see also Order Denying
Motions for Summary Judgment, Recommending Permission to Appeal Pursuant to I.A.R.
12(c)(2), & Staying Proceedings at 28, Tucker v. State, No. CV-OC-2015-10240 (Idaho Jud.
Dist. Ct. Mar. 19, 2019) (summarizing the plaintiffs’ claim that their burden is to show “that
Defendants’ policies and practices have created a substantial risk that indigent defendants’
rights under the Sixth Amendment or Idaho Constitution will be violated”), modified, 484
P.3d 851 (Idaho 2021); see Stephen F. Hanlon, The Appropriate Legal Standard Required to
Prevail in a Systemic Challenge to an Indigent Defense System, 61 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 625, 648–50
(2017).
161 Kuren, 146 A.3d at 736; see also Hurrell-Harring, 930 N.E.2d at 226; Duncan, 774
N.W.2d at 125; Law & Motion Minute Order at 4, Phillips v. State, No. 15CECG02201 (Cal.
Sup. Ct. Apr. 12, 2016) (“[P]laintiffs in this action are not challenging individual
convictions.”).
162 E.g., Kuren, 146 A.3d at 718 (describing injunctive relief request as for adequate
funding for a public defender’s office).
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Thus far the exact contours of the Sixth Amendment rights and
remedies at stake in this litigation have not settled out. Some participants in this litigation have couched the right in terms of Cronic:
systemic deficiencies so mar indigent defense systems that each
indigent defendant is constructively denied his right to counsel. 163
This design is consistent with an individual rights conception of the
Sixth Amendment; systemic dysfunction is so bad that it renders a
Strickland inquiry for each individual defendant unnecessary. But this
Cronic conception has staggering remedial implications. A successful
lawsuit would effectively mean that every indigent defendant within the
system should have his conviction vacated, regardless of the strength
of evidence of his culpability. Litigants and courts have consistently
disavowed these consequences. Participants either reject Cronic’s relevance or they intend Cronic to have a different meaning in IR litigation
than it has in postconviction proceedings. 164
One aspect of rights design is clear. Citing Strickland, defendants
in Sixth Amendment class actions argue that a challenge cannot
proceed without individualized inquiries into the prejudicial effects
that systemic deficiencies have on each class member’s prosecution. 165
Courts that allow these cases to proceed reject this argument. 166 As the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained, “[a]pplying the Strickland test
to the category of claims” in a systemic case is “illogical.” These plaintiffs do not advance “individual claims of ineffective assistance” but
rather challenge “widespread and endemic inability.” “[G]eneral
allegations” about insufficient staffing and overworked personnel “in
no way resemble the individual ineffectiveness claims . . . in Strickland.”
The Court concluded: “There is no performance by individual counsel
to evaluate . . . .”167

163 E.g., Hurrell-Harring, 930 N.E.2d at 225–26.
164 Tucker, 484 P.3d at 858; Reply in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification
at 9, Davis v. State, No. 170C002271B (Nev. Jud. Dist. Ct. filed May 24, 2019)
(“Defendants . . . confuse this Gideon challenge to the State’s system of indigent defense
with a post-conviction individual ineffective-assistance-of-counsel challenge like the one in
Cronic.”); cf. Eve Brensike Primus, Disaggregating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Doctrine: Four
Forms of Constitutional Ineffectiveness, 72 STAN. L. REV. 1581, 1615 (2020) (referring to
“structural Cronic violations”).
165 See Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012, 1017 (11th Cir. 1988); Kuren, 146 A.3d 715 at
746–47; Hurrell-Harring, 930 N.E.2d 217; Duncan, 774 N.W.2d at 138; Law & Motion Minute
Order, supra note 161, at 4; cf. Remick v. Utah, No. 16–CV–789, 2018 WL 1472484, at *14–
15 (D. Utah Mar. 23, 2018) (insisting that plaintiffs must allege that deficiencies prejudiced
their individual cases to state a Sixth Amendment claim in the context of a systemic
challenge); Cox v. Utah, No. 16–CV–53, 2016 WL 6905414, at *5–6 (D. Utah Nov. 7, 2016).
166 E.g., Law & Motion Minute Order, supra note 161, at 6.
167 Kuren, 146 A.3d at 746.
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In short, Strickland’s irrelevance makes indivisible liability
determinations appropriate. Because a court does not need to evaluate the causal consequences of systemic dysfunction for individual
defendants, it can adjudicate the system’s constitutionality for all class
members together. 168
Although mostly muddy, the remedial picture has two clear
features. Courts will not vacate individual convictions, 169 and relief will
be indivisible. One injunction required the defendant cities to monitor the quality of indigent defense services and to take systemic steps
to improve them. 170 If settlements are any guide, remedies might
include other sorts of terms, such as caseload maximums for indigent
defense counsel, adequate training, and better investigator and
interpreter resources. 171 None of this relief could possibly benefit
discrete individuals without benefiting the group.
An individual criminal defendant suffers a Sixth Amendment
violation if his lawyer’s ineffectiveness affects the outcome. A rights
violation gets adjudicated postconviction. If the defendant meets the
Strickland test (a divisible liability determination), he gets to have his
conviction vacated (a divisible remedy). A class of indigent defendants, by contrast, suffers a Sixth Amendment violation when an
indigent defense system is so overburdened that lawyers cannot meet
with clients regularly, access sufficient investigator resources, file
motions to suppress, and perform other basic defense tasks. 172 The
Sixth Amendment claim’s adjudication proceeds independent of any
person’s actual conviction, and thus generates an indivisible liability
determination for all defendants in the system together. If class
members prevail, they win an indivisible remedy—something like an
order lowering public defender caseloads, creating monitoring and
training programs, and increasing investigator and translator
resources.
B. Understanding the Sixth Amendment Rights-Remedies Relationship
In a couple of instances, courts rejecting Strickland’s relevance in
IR cases have insisted that the Sixth Amendment right remains
unchanged from the form it assumes in postconviction proceedings.
168 Duncan, 774 N.W.2d at 139 (“[T]he factual question that will be of any relevance to all
class members revolves around the establishment of widespread and systemic instances of
deficient performance and denial of counsel; the case’s viability with regard to all members
depends on an aggregation of harm that is pervasive and persistent.”).
169 Supra note 161.
170 Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1135–37 (W.D. Wash. 2013).
171 Stipulation & Order of Settlement at 7–10, Hurrell-Harring v. State, No. 8866-07
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 21, 2014).
172 See e.g., Duncan, 774 N.W.2d at 126–27.
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Strickland determines “[w]hether an accused has been prejudiced by
the denial of a right,” “relates to relief,” and thus does not determine
whether “a right exists.” 173 This rigid boundary between right and
remedy is implausible by the terms of either of the two main accounts
of the rights-remedies relationship in public law. 174 Both the
“pragmatist” and the “decision rules” accounts confirm that
differences between group and individual remedies correspond to
differences in the substance of Sixth Amendment doctrine. 175
1. The Pragmatist Account
Daryl Levinson uses what he calls “rights essentialism” as an
explanatory foil for his pragmatist account of the rights-remedies
relationship. 176 A rights essentialist insists “that rights are defined by
courts through a mystical process of identifying ‘pure’ constitutional
values without regard to the sorts of functional, fact-specific policy concerns that are relegated to the remedial sphere.” 177 Only after “rights
are defined and ends therefore established” do courts, accounting for
various practical and institutional concerns, shape the remedy
“instrumentally.”178
A pragmatist account does not embrace the claim long associated
with legal realism that rights simply equal the remedies issued to
enforce them. 179 (To a legal realist, this equivalence means that group
and individual Sixth Amendment rights indisputably differ.) But,
Levinson argues, rights and remedies do share an “intimate
relationship” and are “inextricably intertwined.”180 The generative
process does not run exclusively from rights to remedies but also “in
the opposite direction, from remedies to rights.” This process is
“remedial equilibration.” 181 A variety of practical and institutional
concerns about the design and consequences of remedies “infiltrate
173 Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012, 1017 (11th Cir. 1988); Law & Motion Minute
Order, supra note 161, at 5.
174 E.g., Nancy Leong, Making Rights, 92 B.U. L. REV. 405, 414 (2012); Jennifer E.
Laurin, Rights Translation and Remedial Disequilibration in Constitutional Criminal Procedure,
110 COLUM. L. REV. 1002, 1013 (2010).
175 Leong, supra note 174, at 414–16 (citing Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision
Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 43–50 (2004); and then citing Laurin, supra note 174, at 1007–08).
176 Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
857, 926 (1999). For the term “[p]ragmatist,” see Berman, supra note 175, at 50.
177 Levinson, supra note 176, at 857.
178 Id. at 884, 869.
179 K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 84 (1960) (“A
right is as big, precisely, as what the courts will do.”); see also Hanoch Dagan, Remedies, Rights,
and Properties, 4 J. TORT L., no. 1, art. 3, at 1, 5 (2011); Smith, supra note 133, at 39.
180 Levinson, supra note 176, at 858.
181 Id. at 884.
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rights” themselves. 182 These concerns include, for instance, unease
with the judicial role in supervising and enforcing remedies, 183 or
judicial inability to identify with precision when rights are violated. 184
As Table 5 summarizes, remedial equilibration of Sixth
Amendment rights leads to different designs of rights depending on
whether groups or individuals sue to vindicate them. A stylized version
of this process for individual rights goes as follows. Gideon conceives of
the Sixth Amendment right as the right to have the services of a
lawyer. 185 The remedy is obvious: jurisdictions that do not appoint
counsel for indigent defendants must do so. If “defendants [are] left
to the mercies of incompetent counsel,” however, 186 this initial remedy
proves inadequate. To mean something, the right needs to strengthen, to require not just the assistance of counsel but minimally
competent counsel. 187
Thus strengthened, however, the Sixth Amendment right poses
daunting remedial implications. Subpar attorney performance is ubiquitous. The remedy for a Sixth Amendment violation, the vacation of
a conviction, could thus erode finality in criminal litigation on a wide
scale. This threat to the government’s “fundamental interest” motivates the prejudice requirement, 188 a “par[ing] back” of the right that
“lower[s]” remedial cost. 189 Equilibrated thusly, the Sixth Amendment
right becomes something different altogether—the right to have the
assistance of counsel be sufficiently effective so as not to prejudice
outcomes.

182 Id. at 914.
183 See id. at 884.
184 See id. at 887.
185 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
186 McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970).
187 See Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 348 (1990) (using this language to describe
“[t]he essence” of the Sixth Amendment right under Gideon).
188 Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985); see Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012, 1017
(11th Cir. 1988).
189 See Levinson, supra note 176, at 889.

Counsel's
assistance

Counsel's
assistance

Group Right

Appointment
of counsel

Appointment
of counsel

Initial Remedy

Effective
assistance of
counsel

Effective
assistance of
counsel

Strengthened
Right

N/A

Widespread
vacation of
convictions
threatens
finality of
criminal
convictions

Remedial Costs

Effective
assistance of
counsel

Representation
effective
enough not to
prejudice
outcomes

Equilibrated
Right
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Individual
Right

Initial Right
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The stylized account of the right-remedy relationship in IR
litigation differs. The first steps are the same. Indigent criminal
defendants receive a right to appointed counsel, then to meaningful
assistance. At this point the path of rights evolution diverges. Because
a group of criminal defendants does not sue to challenge particular
convictions and seek their vacation, the remedy does not trigger
finality costs. The right’s content thus does not include a prejudice
requirement. 190 A remedy designed for institutional reform, such as
better funding or improved oversight, imposes different costs, to be
sure. But thus far courts receptive to this litigation have dismissed
these costs as insufficiently important to equilibrate the right. 191
The pragmatist understanding of the relationship between rights
and remedies does not simply equate the right to the remedy but allows
some conceptual distance between the two. A legal realist would
describe a Sixth Amendment group right as one to a competently
administered, adequately funded indigent defense system. A pragmatist by contrast might accept a more abstractly articulated right (“right
to counsel’s effective assistance,” for instance). But the two accounts
draw the same ultimate lesson from the rights-remedies relationship.
The need to account for the remedy’s influence on the right’s
construction leads to a design of Sixth Amendment rights that differs
depending on whether a group or an individual litigates them.
2. The Decision Rules Account
The “decision rules” account, pragmatism’s chief alternative,
posits a wider conceptual divide between rights and remedies. As
Mitchell Berman explains, when courts develop the substance of
constitutional law, they articulate both a “constitutional operative
proposition[]” and a “constitutional decision rule[].” The former is
“the proper meaning of a constitutional power, right, duty, or other

190 See Hurrell-Harring v. State, 930 N.E.2d 217, 226 (N.Y. 2010) (reasoning that the
Sixth Amendment determination does not need a prejudice requirement because the way
the court conceives of the “claims” in a class action seeking prospective relief “eliminat[es]
any possibility that the collateral adjudication of generalized claims of ineffective assistance
might be used to obtain relief from individual judgments of conviction”); Luckey, 860 F.2d
at 1017 (noting that considerations like “finality . . . do not apply when only prospective
relief is sought”).
191 Compare Duncan v. State, 774 N.W.2d 89, 167–68 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009) (Whitbeck,
J., dissenting), aff’d on other grounds, 866 N.W.2d 407 (Mich. 2010), with Hurrell-Harring, 930
N.E.2d at 227 (“It is, of course, possible that a remedy in this action would necessitate the
appropriation of funds and perhaps . . . some reordering of legislative priorities. But this
does not amount to an argument upon which a court might be relieved of its essential
obligation to provide a remedy for violation of a fundamental constitutional right . . . .”);
see also Tucker v. State, 394 P.3d 54, 68–69 (Idaho 2017).
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sort of provision,”192 while the latter gives courts directions for how to
adjudicate claims that involve the operative provision. 193 The Equal
Protection Clause’s operative provision, for instance, amounts to
something like the following: “the government may not treat some
people worse than others without adequate justification.” 194 The
familiar tiers of scrutiny are the decision rules that determine when a
particular government action violates this operative provision. 195
Together, the operative provision and the decision rule form
constitutional doctrine’s substance. 196
Operative provisions include rights. They and their decision rules
“lie upstream” from the determination of whether the defendant
violates a right in a particular instance. Logically, the content of rights
and decision rules must also come before the court fashions a remedy
for that particular violation. 197 A good deal of legal space thus divides
rights from remedies. Decision rules, occupying this space, buffer
rights from the sorts of practical and institutional pressures that, by the
pragmatist account, lead to rights adjustment through remedial
equilibration. 198 Operative provisions remain articulated as “general
propositions” that do not vary from one enforcement context to the
next. 199 Adjustments to decision rules, not operative provisions,
account for more pragmatic concerns. 200
As Table 6 indicates, the decision rules account allows the
possibility that the Sixth Amendment right understood solely as its
operative provision—something like “criminal defendants have a right
to counsel’s meaningful assistance”—remains constant whether an
individual or group vindicates it. Vacation of an individual defendant’s
conviction raises institutional concerns for finality and judicial economy. But the decision rule, not the operative provision, accounts for
these concerns. Hence the two-pronged decision rule from Strickland
that completes the substantive doctrine for individual postconviction
challenges: (1) criminal defendants must overcome a “strong
192 Berman, supra note 175, at 9; see also Laurin, supra note 174, at 1012.
193 Berman, supra note 175, at 9, 12; Mitchell N. Berman, Aspirational Rights and the
Two-Output Thesis, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 220, 221 (2006).
194 Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitutional Calcification: How the Law Becomes What the Court
Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1657 (2005).
195 See id. at 1677.
196 See Berman, supra note 193, at 221.
197 See Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Constructions and Constitutional Decision Rules:
Thoughts on the Carving of Implementation Space, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 39, 41 (2010); see also
Laurin, supra note 174, at 1014 (distinguishing among operative provisions, decision rules,
and remedial rules).
198 See Roosevelt, supra note 194, at 1658–67.
199 Id. at 1658; Laurin, supra note 174, at 1059.
200 See Roosevelt, supra note 194, at 1658.
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presumption” that their lawyers performed acceptably, and (2)
defendants must show that deficient performance was prejudicial to
the outcome. 201
The decision rules account yields a different body of substantive
Sixth Amendment doctrine for groups. The concerns that motivate
the Strickland decision rule disappear. Courts receptive to systemic
claims have rejected defendants’ arguments that plaintiffs must show
prejudice to individual defendants for this reason. The decision rule
assumes a different form, something like the defendants’ obligation to
show that systemic deficiencies create a “considerable risk” of the
denial of Sixth Amendment rights “with a fair degree of regularity.”202
TABLE 6: SIXTH AMENDMENT OPERATIVE PROVISIONS AND DECISION
RULES FOR INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS
Operative
Provision
Individuals Right to
counsel’s
meaningful
assistance

Groups

Right to
counsel’s
meaningful
assistance

Decision Rule(s)

Remedy

Strong presumption of
competence
performance, and
defendant’s obligation
to show that counsel’s
performance
prejudiced the
outcome
A showing that
systemic deficiencies
create a “considerable
risk” that defendants
will be denied Sixth
Amendment rights
with a “fair degree of
regularity”

Vacation of
conviction

Systemic
reform (better
funding, etc.)

201 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689–92 (1984); see also Christopher N.
Lasch, “Crimmigraion” and the Right to Counsel at the Border Between Civil and Criminal
Proceedings, 99 IOWA L. REV. 2131, 2141 (2014) (providing a decision rules account of
Strickland).
202 Hurrell-Harring v. State, 930 N.E.2d 217, 227 (N.Y. 2010); Tucker v. State, 484 P.3d
851, 865–66 (Idaho 2021) (requiring plaintiffs to prove that “Idaho’s public defense system
suffers from widespread, persistent structural deficiencies that likely will result in indigent
defendants suffering actual or constructive denials of counsel at critical stages of criminal
proceedings”); Hanlon, supra note 160, 648–49.
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The substance of Sixth Amendment doctrine, which includes
both the operative provision and the decision rule, thus depends on
whether an individual or a group alleges the violation. Defined
narrowly to include just its operative provision, the Sixth Amendment
right is not litigant-dependent. But the decision rules account keeps it
so only by cleaving off decision rules from operative provisions. Sixth
Amendment substance includes both and thus splits into different
strains depending on whether an individual or a group presses the
claim.
*

*

*

Liability determinations and remedies are divisible when
individuals litigate postconviction challenges. They become indivisible
when groups seek systemic reform. This contrast results from
differences in Sixth Amendment rights design.
An indigent defense reform lawsuit is just one type of IR litigation.
But the Sixth Amendment right is “universally regarded as an
individual right.” 203 If group Sixth Amendment rights exist, and if a
group rights account makes sense of otherwise puzzling features in
transsubstantive procedural doctrine, then there is no reason why
group rights have not likewise taken root in other public law domains.
IV.

JURISPRUDENTIAL AND DOCTRINAL BEGINNINGS

Some courts involved in IR litigation have grasped, if haltingly,
that there is something afoot substantively in the cases they adjudicate.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court distinguished “structural” from
“individual” Sixth Amendment claims, for instance, when it allowed a
systemic challenge to a malfunctioning indigent defense system to
proceed. 204 A Ninth Circuit opinion in the Arizona prison healthcare
case differentiated between “institutional reform claims” and
“individual Eighth Amendment claims.” 205 But participants in IR
litigation have not fashioned a coherent terminology for this
phenomenon. Lawyers and judges in two foster care reform cases, for
instance, referred variously to “‘harms’ exist[ing] on a macro-level,”206
“class-wide institutional claims,” 207 an “‘individual-plaintiff-blind’
203 Guggenheim, supra note 150, at 395; see also Julian Darwall & Martin Guggenheim,
Funding the People’s Right, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 619 (2012).
204 Kuren v. Luzerne Cnty., 146 A.3d 715, 746 (Pa. 2016).
205 Parsons v. Ryan, 784 F.3d 571, 578 (9th Cir. 2015) (Ikuta, J., dissenting) (mem.)
(citing Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 677 (9th Cir. 2014)).
206 Defendants’ Motion in Limine to Preclude Evidence of Individual Case Histories at
1, Connor B. ex rel. Vigurs v. Patrick, No. 10–CV–30073 (D. Mass. filed Dec. 21, 2012).
207 Connor B. ex rel. Vigurs v. Patrick, 985 F. Supp. 2d 129, 166 (D. Mass. 2013).
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approach,” 208 and “a ‘multifaceted request for broad-based injunctive
relief.’” 209
Parts II and III argue that group rights exist. If I am right, they
sorely need jurisprudential and doctrinal explication. The last efforts
in this regard came during institutional reform’s formative era, and
much has changed since then. This task requires more than what I can
do here. But a couple of initial steps are possible, and I take them in
this Part. The first is to define group rights and to identify which
groups can enjoy them, so that participants in IR litigation can better
understand their cases’ substance. I distill from how courts have
resolved various procedural, substantive, and remedial matters in IR
cases two definitional traits—liability and remedy indivisibility.
Liability and remedy indivisibility, in turn, indicate what types of
groups can benefit from rights protection.
The second step is to show why the proper understanding of rights
design matters to the management and adjudication of IR litigation. I
use two doctrinal problems these cases often encounter to highlight
the benefits of conceptual clarity.
A. Defining Group Rights and Identifying Groups
The term “group rights” drew political heat in the 1980s.
Conservative lawyers and commentators weaponized the term in their
fight against a Fissian conception of equal protection, one whose
implementation would have required a reckoning with structural
racism and subordination and would have supported controversial
remedies like affirmative action. 210 In their imagining, “group rights”
meant special advantages for people identified by sociologically
determined identities. Fiss arguably understood group rights in this
fashion as well. He argued, for instance, that equal protection rights
exist “primarily, but not exclusively, as a protection for blacks,”211 a
208 Defendants’ Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification at 40,
M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Perry, 294 F.R.D. 7 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (No. 11–CV–84), 2012 WL
13049817.
209 Connor B. ex rel. Vigurs v. Patrick, 771 F. Supp. 2d 142, 158 (D. Mass. 2011)
(quoting LaShawn A. ex rel. Moore v. Kelly, 990 F.2d 1319, 1323 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).
210 E.g., L.H. Gann & Alvin Rabushka, Racial Classification: Politics of the Future?, POL’Y
REV., Summer 1981, at 87, 88 (arguing that new concepts of “group rights” would make
“ethic affinity” count more than “personal merit”); William Bradford Reynolds,
Individualism vs. Group Rights: The Legacy of Brown, 93 YALE L.J. 995, 996 (1984) (insisting
that “[t]he essential concern for individual opportunity” at equal protection’s core was
increasingly “submerged . . . beneath a rising tide of group entitlements,” and describing
group rights as a “fundamental distortion of civil rights in a democratic society”). For a
recent use of the term “group rights” to this effect, see THE PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY 1776
COMM’N, THE 1776 REPORT 15 (2021).
211 Fiss, supra note 48, at 147.
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“natural class[], or social group[], in American society” whose systemic
subordination requires remediation. 212 For a species of group rights
defined in these terms, groups first exist, and rights then follow to
protect them.
But group rights have emerged in some public law domains
without intense handwringing over what groups have sufficient “moral
standing” to warrant rights protection. 213 The substantive law has
constituted groups in a common-law process of elaboration driven by
contingency and circumstance, one prompted by the recognition that,
in certain contexts, group rights better realize the values and policies
of the substantive law than individual rights. Group rights thus develop
for an instrumental reason, to benefit people who share little other
than a common interest in the government obeying the law. Put
differently, rights exist and groups follow.
My account of the present-day makeup of substantive law in IR
litigation follows from how courts actually decide claims and issue
remedies, not on deeply contested claims about which groups really
exist and warrant protection or advantage. As the discussions in Parts
II and III demonstrate, courts often adjudicate defendants’ liability
without requiring the plaintiffs to prove harm or wrongdoing specific
to any particular individual, and they issue remedies that benefit
groups as a whole and no specific member of them. Such cases, I
argue, involve group rights, whether these rights involve socially or
instrumentally determined groups. The group rights genus thus includes more species than what 1980s-era debates recognized.
1. Liability and Remedy Indivisibility
Before the lawyers who brought the Texas foster care reform case
filed suit in Corpus Christi, they litigated a similar foster care reform
class action in Massachusetts. At several key litigation moments, these
lawyers and their state agency adversary clashed over the design of the
children’s substantive due process right. Because the plaintiffs alleged
violations of individual rights, the agency insisted, the case required
individualized liability determinations unsuitable for a class action. 214
“We are not ever asking this Court for anything approaching individual

212 Id. at 148.
213 Peter Jones, Collective Rights, Public Goods, and Participatory Goods, in HOW GROUPS
MATTER: CHALLENGES OF TOLERATION IN PLURALISTIC SOCIETIES 52, 53 (Gideon Calder,
Magali Bessone & Federico Zuolo eds., 2014).
214 Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification at 23, Connor
B., 771 F. Supp. 2d at 142 (No. 10–CV–30073).
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determinations” of rights violations, the children’s lawyer
responded. 215
By the time of trial, the parties agreed that the agency’s liability
hinged on the overall quality of how it administered Massachusetts’
foster care system. Their joint pretrial memorandum summarized the
plaintiffs’ prima facie case and the agency’s defense with no mention
of any factual or legal dispute over individual children’s injuries. 216
Indeed, pivoting 180 degrees, the agency moved before trial to exclude
any evidence of individual children’s experiences in foster care as
“irrelevant, [and] prejudicial.” 217 Had the plaintiffs prevailed, they
presumably would have asked for an injunction similar to the one the
Texas judge later issued, a remedy requiring systemic changes to foster
care management and funding but nothing fashioned to fix any
particular child’s situation. 218
The rights adjudicated in these episodes of foster care reform
litigation share features with the right to a “unitary, nonracial” school
system articulated in Jefferson County, 219 or with the Arizona inmates’
right to an adequately administered prison healthcare system. 220
Elizabeth Burch argues that a violation of the sort of “inherently
aggregate” right shared by Arizona inmates or Massachusetts children
“arises from an aggregate harm that affects a group equally and

215 Transcript of Motion Hearing at 32, Connor B., 771 F. Supp. 2d at 142 (No. 10–CV–
30073).
216 Joint Pretrial Memorandum at 4–11, Connor B. ex rel. Vigurs v. Patrick, 985 F. Supp.
2d 129 (D. Mass. 2013) (No. 10–30073). Under a District of Massachusetts local rule, the
parties’ joint pretrial memorandum must summarize the evidence they plan to submit at
trial, identify contested and uncontested issues of facts that remain in the case, and describe
all issues of law that require resolution. D. MASS. LOC. R. 16.5(d). Neither of the parties’
trial briefs suggested an intention to establish individual children’s injuries and their cause.
See Plaintiffs’ Trial Brief at 1, Connor B., 985 F. Supp. 2d 129 (No. 10–30073); Defendants’
Trial Brief at 1, Connor B., 985 F. Supp. 2d 129 (No. 10–30073).
217 Joint Pretrial Memorandum, supra note 216, at 13; see also Defendants’ Motion in
Limine to Preclude Evidence of Individual Case Histories, supra note 206, at 1 (“Evidence
of any particular child’s experience is irrelevant, [and] diverts attention from the issues at
hand . . . .”). Class counsel argued that individual children’s experiences were admissible
to “illustrate the harms that Plaintiffs allege” and thereby “bring the ‘cold numbers’” in
statistical evidence “convincingly to life.” Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’ Motion in
Limine to Preclude Evidence of Individual Case Histories at 3, 5, Connor B. ex rel. Vigurs v.
Patrick, No. 10–CV–30073 (D. Mass. filed Jan. 4, 2013) (quoting Int’l Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977)).
218 M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Abbott, 907 F.3d 237, 272–87 (5th Cir. 2018) (describing
the district court’s injunction).
219 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
220 See supra notes 87–89.
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collectively.” 221 This feature is exactly the liability indivisibility described in Part II. An “aggregate harm” that people suffer “equally”
by definition excludes harms with particularized effects for discrete
individuals. The defendant’s liability does not require any determination of the particular consequences of its conduct for individuals. But
liability indivisibility includes more than just the evidentiary
irrelevance of individual treatment. Because the harm is suffered
“collectively,” a court can only determine the defendant’s liability for
all at once and not individually, victim-by-victim.
A group right’s second core characteristic is remedy indivisibility. 222 A remedy cannot be parceled out individual-by-individual but
must benefit the group as a whole. Jefferson County contemplated a
wholesale restructuring of a segregated school system, relief that
necessarily benefited all black children at once. Likewise, the remedial
benefits of reduced caseloads for caseworkers cannot be parceled out
child-by-child in Texas. Nor can better training and supervision for
public defenders benefit discrete indigent defendants without
benefiting all of them.
A group right needs to have both characteristics to qualify.
Liability indivisibility is not uncommon. The Telephone Consumer
Protection Act (TCPA) prohibits businesses from contacting potential
customers by text or phone call using an “automatic telephone dialing
system” (ATDS). 223 A dialing system qualifies if it can “store or
produce telephone numbers to be called” or texted, and if the system
can “dial” or text “such numbers.” 224 If 1,000 people receive unsolicited texts from a business, the business’s TCPA liability can only be
determined for all of them at once. Either the business used or did
not use an ATDS. But no one would label a TCPA right a group right.
An individual aggrieved by an unsolicited text message could sue and
collect the $500 the TCPA awards her without remediating the harm
done to any other recipient. 225
Likewise remedy indivisibility is not enough. Someone incurs
liability under California nuisance law if that person “wrongfully
cause[s] water to flow upon another’s land which would not flow there

221 Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Calibrating Participation: Reflections on Procedure Versus
Procedural Justice, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 323, 338, 342 (2016); see also Elizabeth Chamblee
Burch, Adequately Representing Groups, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3043, 3051 (2013).
222 See Burch, Calibrating, supra note 221, at 338–50. For a rich discussion of
indivisibility in the context of civil rights class actions, see Maureen Carroll, Class Actions,
Indivisibility, and Rule 23(b)(2), 99 B.U. L. REV. 59 (2019).
223 Duran v. La Boom Disco, Inc., 955 F.3d 279, 280 (2d Cir. 2020).
224 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1)(A)–(B) (2018); Duran, 955 F.3d at 289.
225 See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) (2018).
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naturally.”226 If a downhill neighbor sues an uphill neighbor for creating this sort of nuisance, a court might order the uphill neighbor to
build an interceptor trench or retention pool. 227 This remedy would
benefit all downhill neighbors. But the nuisance right isn’t a group
right. Proof that water flowed wrongly onto one downhill neighbor’s
land does not prove that it also flowed wrongly on other downhill
neighbors’ properties. Each one would have to prove that the uphill
neighbor caused water to flow wrongfully on their land. Otherwise,
the downhill neighbors who do not sue enjoy the remedy without any
claim of entitlement to it.
Indivisible liability means that the substantive law only concerns
itself with the defendant’s conduct toward a group of undifferentiated
members. Likewise, an indivisible remedy means the right’s vindication cannot benefit discrete individuals but only the group to which
they belong. If a right whose adjudication shares these characteristics
is an individual right, it is only so in the most trivial sense—as the right
of an individual to have the group to which she belongs protected from
harm, by a remedy that protects her not due to individual entitlement
but by virtue of her membership in the group. Nothing about the
individual qua individual matters. Hence, the term “group rights”
better describes those whose adjudication meets the two indivisibility
characteristics.
2. Socially and Instrumentally Determined Groups
Indivisibility can take different forms. Some group rights involve
liability and remedial determinations that are necessarily indivisible.
The right to an undiluted vote—the right against a districting plan that
unduly weakens a group’s voting strength—illustrates. 228 No individualized option exists for the design of this “inherently aggregate” right,
which turns not on how the districting scheme treats any particular
individual but how the scheme treats the group. 229 The substantive law
can either protect against the group’s disenfranchisement or not at all.
A right of this sort presupposes a group with some measure of
intra-group solidarity. The effect of district boundaries on the political
power of certain groups does not matter unless individual voters
identify their political preferences with certain types of socially
226 Aspen Grove Condo. Ass’n v. CNL Income Northstar LLC, 179 Cal. Rptr. 3d 429,
437 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Allen v. Stowell, 79 P. 371, 372 (Cal. 1905)).
227 Id. at 436.
228 See Samuel Issacharoff, Groups and the Right to Vote, 44 EMORY L.J. 869, 883–84
(1995); see also Adam B. Cox, The Temporal Dimension of Voting Rights, 93 VA. L. REV. 361, 367
(2007); Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV.
1663, 1681 (2001).
229 See Gerken, supra note 228, at 1685–86.
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determined group identities. This “intra-group solidarity” gives the
group the “moral standing” 230 that makes it “the sort of thing to which
duties can be owed and which is capable of being wronged.” 231
Likewise, there must be some sort of universal recognition that a
particular group deserves some sort of protection or advantage before
the right attaches. 232 The group, then, exists “in advance of the
interests . . . and the rights it bears.”233
Other group rights, by contrast, only share the indivisibility
characteristics in certain contexts. When a class of inmates challenges
systemic inadequacies in the overall administration of prison
healthcare, the court determines the system’s constitutionality under
the Eighth Amendment for all inmates together, with an indivisible
liability finding. 234 A remedy for an unconstitutional healthcare system
might include better funding for prison healthcare, improved staffing
levels for healthcare workers, and better record-keeping systems—all
indivisible benefits that inmates share. 235 But, as noted in Part II,
injured inmates routinely bring Eighth Amendment prison healthcare
claims in individual lawsuits that seek individualized remedies. The
right to adequate prison healthcare, unlike a right to an undiluted
vote, is only contextually indivisible. It can protect against systemic
threats to the group, or it can protect individuals from individualized
harm.
When a right can plausibly take either an individual or a group
cast, the existence of a group with a preexisting, socially determined
identity does not dictate when it assumes the latter design. Rather, the
choice turns on instrumental considerations. Jefferson County and
Wisdom’s right to a “unitary, nonracial” school system came after a
decade during which an individual rights version of Brown frustrated
the realization of its promise. 236 Embracing a group version of a Sixth
Amendment right, a Michigan court of appeals explained that
“[w]idespread and systemic instances of deficient performance caused
by a poorly equipped appointed-counsel system will not cease and be
cured with a case-by-case examination of individual criminal
appeals.” 237 In Fissian terms, the adjudication of individual rights fails
230 Jones, supra note 19.
231 Peter Jones, Group Rights and Group Oppression, 7 J. POL. PHIL. 353, 362 (1999).
232 See Issacharoff, supra note 228, at 883–84.
233 Jones, supra note 231, at 363.
234 Cf. Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 676–77 (9th Cir. 2014) (describing the contours
of an Eighth Amendment claim for systemic harm).
235 Cf. Stipulation at 3–4, Parsons v. Ryan, No. CV–12–601 (D. Ariz. filed Oct. 14, 2014);
Exhibit B to Stipulation, supra note 114, at 2.
236 United States v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 847 (5th Cir. 1966).
237 Duncan v. State, 774 N.W.2d 89, 126 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009), aff’d on other grounds,
866 N.W.2d 407 (Mich. 2010).
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to give public meaning to Sixth or Fourteenth Amendment values.
This fact justifies the right’s rearticulation in group terms, one that
yields liability and remedial indivisibility.
When a group right emerges for this instrumental reason, the
group that benefits from it does not exist by some thick, extralegal
metric. In other words, a right can attach without universal agreement
that children in Texas foster care or inmates in Arizona prisons exist
as socially determined groups. The group is defined thinly by
members’ shared interests in a particular good the government has a
duty to provide. 238 Courts recognize group rights when confronted
with an entrenched gap between values and policies in the substantive
law and a systemic failure by the responsible institution to provide the
public good these values demand. 239 In other words, groups do not
exist apart from the rights they litigate. The substantive law constitutes
groups and their rights in a process of elaboration driven by context.
The Eighth Amendment again illustrates. In theory, a wave of
individual lawsuits, each one concerned with individual manifestations
of the state’s mismanagement, and each one seeking an individualized
remedy, could have prompted a Department of Corrections to make
systemic changes. The Department might prefer to do so than pay one
money judgment after the next or comply with numerous discrete
injunctions. But structural flaws in the market for legal services for
inmates will leave most unrepresented. 240 Those who find lawyers face
limits on monetary recovery, 241 as well as a variety of procedural
hurdles that often place a merits determination out of reach. 242
Given these circumstances, a group right requiring a welladministered, adequately funded prison healthcare system better
realizes inmates’ collective interests and the policies and values the
Eighth Amendment contains. Competent policy administration is a
public good, one that no inmate on his own can demand, but one the
strength of inmates’ interests bundled together can warrant. 243 The
group right makes more efficient use of limited public interest lawyer
238 See Jones, supra note 213, at 67; see also Joseph Raz, Rights and Politics, 71 IND. L.J.
27, 32, 42 (1995).
239 Cf. PAUL SHEEHY, THE REALITY OF SOCIAL GROUPS 176 (2006) (“There is also
a[n] . . . instrumental basis for group rights. . . . It may turn out that the most effective
means of protecting individual liberties . . . is to assign rights to groups.”).
240 Among other issues, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) caps attorneys’ fees
at 150% of the prisoner plaintiff’s recovery. Eleanor Umphres, Note, 150% Wrong: The
Prison Litigation Reform Act and Attorney’s Fees, 56 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 261, 261–62 (2019).
241 E.g., McAdoo v. Martin, 899 F.3d 521, 525 (8th Cir. 2018) (describing the PLRA’s
damages limits).
242 E.g., Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523–525 (2002) (describing the PLRA’s
exhaustion requirement).
243 Cf. RAZ, supra note 19, at 208 (using these terms to describe a “collective right”).
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resources, and its contours allow the group to seek a remedy broad
enough to address systemic management failures.
The difference between necessary and contextual indivisibility
corresponds with the different species of group rights. One—the right
to an undiluted vote, for instance—protects socially determined
groups whose identity commands particular advantage or protection.
The other includes rights that get fashioned for instrumental reasons,
because liability and remedy indivisibility do a better job at realizing
the substantive law’s values and policies than individual rights do.
The former species, characterized by necessary indivisibility, has
proven controversial because, as Peter Schuck argues, its
presupposition of group identity requires “judges to determine the
relative social status, mobility, and political efficacy of competing
groups.” 244 But group rights of the latter species, including those that
protect children in foster care, inmates, and indigent criminal
defendants, have evolved to assume their current design largely
without sparking the same political heat. Indeed, their articulation as
group rights has happened largely without any comment at all.
B. Understanding Group Rights’ Doctrinal Significance
Conceptual clarity in understandings of group rights is a matter
of more than just jurisprudential concern. The demystification of
group rights should encourage courts to recognize their existence
more forthrightly. Doing so would help solve nettlesome doctrinal
problems that require an appreciation for the distinction between
individuals and groups as litigants. The rest of this Part illustrates.
1. Younger Abstention
Abstention, long a problem in IR litigation, is a good example of
the kind of problem that open acknowledgment about rights design
could resolve. 245 Under Younger v. Harris and its progeny, a federal
court must abstain from adjudicating a constitutional challenge if
doing so would “improper[ly] intru[de] on the right of a state to
enforce its laws in its own courts.” 246 If there exists an “ongoing state
judicial proceeding” that “implicate[s] important state interests,”
abstention is required if the federal plaintiff has “an adequate
244 Peter H. Schuck, Groups in a Diverse, Dynamic, Competitive, and Liberal Society:
Comments on Owen Fiss’s “Groups and the Equal Protection Clause,” 2 ISSUES IN LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP, no. 1, art. 15, at 6 (2003); see also Isaacharoff, supra note 228, at 872–73
(discussing this problem with regard to the right to undiluted vote).
245 For the early administration of Younger abstention doctrine in an institutional
reform case, see O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 499–502 (1974).
246 17B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 95, § 4251.
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opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional
challenges.”247
Younger looms whenever a plaintiff in federal court litigation has
a state court proceeding open to her to vindicate her claims. It has
surfaced repeatedly in IR litigation involving failed foster care reform
and indigent defense systems. State child welfare agencies invariably
move to dismiss foster care reform class actions on Younger grounds,
for instance, because children in every state’s system remain under
state judicial supervision during their periods of commitment. 248
Individual children can complain of individual rights violations in
these individualized proceedings, so the argument goes. 249
This defense prompts litigation over what is really a matter of
rights design. In the Massachusetts case, for instance, the state argued
that, because “individual plaintiffs have the opportunity to raise their
constitutional claims in” each one’s Juvenile Court proceeding and
“obtain ‘an adequate remedy’” there, “Younger abstention is
required—even if the state court remedy does not encompass the
systemic relief that plaintiffs seek.” 250 Class counsel faulted the argument as a “fundamental misreading of Plaintiffs’ Complaint.” 251 “This
case is not about specific social worker lapses in judgment or individual
performance failures,” it argued. 252 Rather, “it is about a pattern and
practice of ongoing harm to children” caused by systemic deficiencies
that result from “decisions made, or not made, by high-level
officials.”253 The class action does not concern particular juvenile
court orders but flows from what is a dysfunctional system, a system in
which certain structural elements are missing. 254
Class counsel’s emphasis on “systemic shortcomings” was
imprecise as far as Younger doctrine goes. 255 Alone, the fact that a state
247 Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n., 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982);
see also Sirva Relocation, LLC v. Richie, 794 F.3d 185, 191–93 (1st Cir. 2015) (discussing
Younger’s evolution).
248 E.g., 31 Foster Child. v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1274–82 (11th Cir. 2003); LaShawn A.
ex rel. Moore v. Kelly, 990 F.2d 1319, 1322–24 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Tinsley v. McKay, 156 F.
Supp. 3d 1024, 1025 (D. Ariz. 2015); Connor B. ex rel. Vigurs v. Patrick, 771 F. Supp. 2d 142,
153–58 (D. Mass. 2011); M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Perry, 799 F. Supp. 2d 712, 717 (S.D.
Tex. 2011), vacated on other grounds, 675 F.3d 832 (5th Cir. 2012); Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v.
Perdue, 218 F.R.D. 277, 285–89 (N.D. Ga. 2003).
249 E.g., Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Complaint
at 61, Connor B., 771 F. Supp. 2d 142 (No. 10–CV–30073).
250 Id. at 61 (quoting Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 15 (1987)).
251 Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at
3, Connor B., 771 F. Supp. 2d 142 (No. 10–CV–30073).
252 Id. at 36.
253 Id.
254 See id. at 13.
255 Id.
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court cannot entertain a systemic challenge or order systemic relief
does not defeat abstention. 256 The threat to an individual child’s rights
may result from systemic deficiencies. But a state court can vindicate
the claimed rights violation and issue an order tailored to the child’s
circumstances, even if it has to leave the systemic deficiencies largely
unaddressed. 257 If, however, children sue in their capacity as group
members, not as individuals, and if they seek to vindicate a group, not
individual, right, then the distinction makes sense. A federal court
does not abstain under Younger if the plaintiff asserts a right that differs
from what the state proceeding adjudicates. 258 Nor does Younger apply
if the federal plaintiff is a different jural entity from the rights-holder
in the state proceeding. 259
Younger motions have left a mess of contradictory decisions for
foster care reform litigation. 260 They have thwarted the federal courts’
involvement in indigent criminal defense reform, steering most of
these cases to state courts. 261 The muddle and Younger along with it
disappear as problems for IR litigation if the underlying substantive
law vests rights in groups and not individuals. When IR litigation in
federal court seems to duplicate state proceedings, the parties should
first determine what duties the substantive law creates for the
government to discharge and whom—individuals alone, or also
groups—this law protects. Only upon the conclusion that the case only
bundles individual rights should abstention turn on Younger concerns
for the adequacy of ongoing state proceedings or the importance of
state interests. Does the Fourteenth Amendment give children as a
group the right to a competently administered foster care system? If
not, then abstention in favor of individualized state proceedings makes
sense. If so, Younger is irrelevant, and the case should proceed.

256 Cf. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 427 (1979) (“The breadth of a challenge to a
complex statutory scheme has traditionally militated in favor of abstention, not against it.”).
257 See Joseph A. ex rel. Wolfe v. Ingram, 275 F.3d 1253, 1274 (10th Cir. 2002) (“We
assume without deciding that the Children’s Court is not authorized to hear class actions
and other representative suits. However, we could find no case, and Appellants cite none,
that hold that a party is entitled to avoid the effects of the Younger abstention doctrine in
cases where relief is available to individual litigants in ongoing state proceedings but not to
represented parties in a class action.” (citing J.B. ex rel. Hart v. Valdez, 186 F.3d 1280, 1292
(10th Cir. 1999))).
258 E.g., Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 101 (2d Cir. 2004); Habich
v. City of Dearborn, 331 F.3d 524, 530–32 (6th Cir. 2003).
259 See Vasquez v. Rackauckas, 734 F.3d 1025, 1035 (9th Cir. 2013).
260 Connor B. ex rel. Vigurs v. Patrick, 771 F. Supp. 2d 142, 156 (D. Mass. 2011)
(summarizing the “disparate conclusions” various courts have reached in these cases).
261 See Drinan, supra note 154, at 468; Lucas, supra note 11, at 93.
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2. Class Certification
Conceptual confusion has also arisen at the class certification
stage. In the years since Wal-Mart, government defendants have shoehorned what are really claims about rights design into arguments
about Rule 23’s administration. Confusing, unnecessarily prolonged
litigation can ensue, with fundamental questions of what and whom
substantive rights protect cloaked in procedural guise. 262
As discussed in Parts I and II, the Rule 23 inquiry in IR cases
focuses on two matters. The first, commonality, asks whether the heart
of class members’ claims lie with questions of law or fact that common,
class-wide arguments and evidence can answer. 263 By definition, claims
alleging violations of group rights involve indivisible liability determinations. Class members’ individual circumstances are irrelevant,
the focus is on the defendant’s conduct toward the aggregate, and thus
claims only raise common questions of law and fact. Second, Rule
23(b)(2) requires that plaintiffs seek a single indivisible remedy. 264
Group rights are group rights because they generate this type of relief.
When plaintiffs allege violations of group rights, then, a court should
need nothing more than the pleadings to decide class certification.
In Wal-Mart’s wake, class certification practice in public interest
litigation has grown complex and protracted. 265 Courts and litigants
have vested Rule 23’s requirements with meaning they cannot bear,
while failing to wrestle forthrightly with underlying substantive
matters. Litigation over a recent petition for certiorari the State of
Arizona filed with the U.S. Supreme Court illustrates. Arizona children had alleged that the state’s terrible administration of its foster
care system created a risk of harm that violated their substantive due
process rights. 266 The Arizona district judge certified the class,
allowing it to seek sweeping injunctive relief. 267 Arizona sought
Supreme Court review after a Ninth Circuit appeal failed. It
formulated the first question presented as follows: “Whether a putative
class may satisfy the commonality requirement . . . by alleging that a
state-run system suffers from ‘systemwide failures’ to which every class
member is ‘exposed’ simply by virtue of being in the system.”268

262 See Marcus, supra note 86, at 426–27.
263 See infra notes 72–73 & accompanying text.
264 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).
265 See Marcus, supra note 86, at 426–27.
266 Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief and Request for Class Action at
48–50, B.K. ex rel. Tinsley v. Flanagan, No. 15–CV–185 (D. Ariz. filed Feb. 3, 2015).
267 See B.K. ex rel. Tinsley v. Snyder, 922 F.3d 957, 964–65 (9th Cir. 2019).
268 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Faust v. B.K. ex rel. Tinsley, 140 S. Ct. 2509 (Mar.
23, 2020) (mem.) (No. 19-765).
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Posed in these terms, the question makes no sense. 269 If the
underlying substantive law gives children as a group the right to be free
from exposure to a risk of harm created by “systemwide failures,” then
the case obviously satisfies the commonality requirement. The right
would require an indivisible liability determination, one for which
individual questions of fact pertaining to the state’s treatment of
individual children have no relevance. If the underlying substantive
law vests substantive due process rights exclusively in individual
children, and if the state’s liability requires divisible determinations,
then the proposed class fails. Answers to questions about inadequate
funding and poor central agency monitoring of caseworkers would not
“drive the resolution” of individual claims of individual rights
violations, as Wal-Mart requires for commonality. 270
Arizona insisted that “there is no way to answer in a single stroke
whether [the] alleged deficiencies amount to deliberate
indifference . . . to ‘all children who are or will be’ in Arizona’s childwelfare system” due to the “individualized nature of [substantive due
process] claims.”271 It cited no source of substantive authority for this
proposition. Instead, Arizona described the district court’s determination that liability could be decided for the class as a whole as “not an
application of Wal-Mart but an abrogation of it.” 272 Wal-Mart addressed
Rule 23’s administration in a case involving Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act. It had nothing to do with substantive due process and how
it protects children from harm. 273
Although Arizona’s petition for certiorari failed, other
government defendants have more successfully leveraged procedural
confusion to derail IR litigation. 274 Milwaukee did so in Jamie S. v.
Milwaukee Public Schools, an early appellate engagement with IR
litigation after Wal-Mart. 275 The plaintiffs, public school children with
disabilities in need of individualized education plans (IEP), convinced
269 Cf. Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at 2, Faust, 140 S. Ct. 2509 (No. 19-765)
(“[T]he State’ [sic] real quarrel is with the well-established substantive due process standard
. . . .”).
270 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011) (quoting Nagareda,
supra note 117, at 132).
271 Petition, supra note 268, at 19, 20.
272 Id. at 20.
273 Cf. Tobias Barrington Wolff, Managerial Judging and Substantive Law, 90 WASH. U.
L. REV. 1027, 1028 (2013) (arguing that Wal-Mart’s “commonality holding . . . is at base a
statement of Title VII policy”).
274 For other examples, see: DL v. District of Columbia, 713 F.3d 120 (D.C. Cir. 2013);
Dearduff v. Washington, 330 F.R.D. 452 (E.D. Mich. 2019).
275 668 F.3d 481 (7th Cir. 2012). For different but complementary criticism of Jamie S.
as conceptually confused, see Maureen Carroll, Class Action Myopia, 65 DUKE L.J. 843, 893
(2016).
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the district court that a range of practices, customs, and policies had
led Milwaukee to fail systematically to meet its obligations under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). 276
The Seventh Circuit reversed the class certification order and
threw out a sweeping remedy crafted after eleven years of litigation.
Whether and how a public school district meets its IDEA obligations,
the court insisted, can only be determined child-by-child. No classwide, indivisible determination of liability is possible absent the claim
that all children’s injuries result from the same explicit, uniform
policy. 277 “There is no such thing,” the Seventh Circuit intoned, “as a
‘systemic’ failure to find and refer individual disabled children for IEP
evaluation.” 278 This statement amounts to a claim about the design of
IDEA liability policy, but the Seventh Circuit did not support it with
any reference to IDEA text or precedent. Rather, the court insisted,
the district court’s indivisible determination of Milwaukee’s liability
“completely misunderst[ood] Rule 23(a)(2).” 279 Rule 23(a)(2), of
course, has nothing to say about IDEA rights and what an alleged
violation requires a plaintiff to prove. What Milwaukee must do for
children with disabilities is a question of substance, not procedure.
CONCLUSION—NORMATIVE BEGINNINGS
This Article has proceeded in an almost entirely descriptive
register. I have attempted to prove the existence of group rights in IR
litigation, then to distill identifying features that define these rights
and the groups that enjoy them from judicial engagements with
institutional reform’s procedural, remedial, and substantive governance. Conceptual clarity on its own packs some modest normative
punch. By hiding substantive elephants in procedural mouseholes,
participants in IR litigation have obscured deeper issues that attend
the choice to fashion rights in group terms. Frank acknowledgment
that groups draw their capacity to sue indivisibly and seek indivisible
remedies from the design of substantive liability regimes should end
confusing jousts over issues like Younger abstention and class
certification.
But the big normative question—when should group rights
coalesce to benefit those seeking institutional reform?—remains
unanswered. A sustained effort at an answer must remain for another
scholarly treatment of institutional reform. I conclude by suggesting
some lines of analysis that might guide an effort of this sort.
276
277
278
279

Jamie S., 668 F.3d at 487–88 (citing 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–82 (2006)).
See id. at 497–98.
Id. at 498.
Id. at 497.
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One involves legitimacy and asks whether courts have the power to
develop group rights doctrine. This is in part a matter of interpretive
license. To Fiss, the power of judges to mold the substantive law came
from the existence of “public values” with a true and important
meaning, coupled with “[t]he function of a judge,” to identify these
values through interpretation and “give [them] concrete meaning and
application.”280 If a group rights design best realizes a particular value
like equality or due process in a particular context, then the judge has
not just the power but the duty to say so. 281 But Fiss’s interpretive
methodology has gone out of style, and judges may be “to one degree
or another, ‘all textualists now.’” 282 What do twenty-first century
interpretive practices mean for the power of courts to fashion group
rights?
Legitimacy also involves institutional considerations. Group
rights enable courts to issue systemic remedies, and systemic remedies
in turn contemplate (often federal) judicial intrusion with (often state
and local) policy administration. Separation of powers and federalism
anxieties have long dogged IR litigation, 283 and rights design may need
to grapple with these concerns more explicitly. The choice to vest a
group with a right also prompts competence concerns, since it
empowers courts to stray from more modest judicial roles and into
more managerial ones. But the previously unobserved entrenchment
of group rights in various public law domains should give those
inclined to such institutional criticism pause, for at least two reasons.
The elaborative process of rights design reflects the accumulation of
judicial determinations, over decades in some instances, that the
substantive law works best if rights benefit groups and not just
individuals. A federalism or separation of powers challenge to IR
litigation does not just question how judges wield equitable discretion
when they craft remedies. It strikes at more fundamental decisions
about rights design and should face a steeper burden of persuasion for
that reason. Also, the thin, instrumentally justified ties that bind
groups in IR litigation should mitigate concern that judges are illsuited to identify groups for particular protection or advantage. 284

280 Fiss, supra note 36, at 2, 9.
281 See Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 759–60 (1982).
282 Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2442 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the
judgment) (quoting Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, “We Are All Textualists Now”: The Legacy of
Justice Antonin Scalia, 91 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 303, 313 (2017)).
283 For a classic treatment of institutional reform and separation of powers problems,
see William A. Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and Judicial
Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635 (1982). For federalism concerns, see, e.g., Horne v. Flores, 557
U.S. 433, 448 (2009).
284 See Schuck, supra note 244, at 6.
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A second line of analysis involves justification. Assuming that
courts have the legitimate power to fashion group rights, what
conditions justify decisions to do so for a particular public law regime,
and for particular sets of victims? Phrased thusly, the question
implicitly presumes a baseline of individual rights, with group rights a
departure. This supposed default reflects the individualistic rights
culture in the United States. But the spread and entrenchment of
group rights that IR plaintiffs leverage gives reason to interrogate this
presumed default. Also, a justification calculus that recognizes that
group rights can coalesce for instrumental reasons should account for
the real-world barriers that weaken the efficacy of individual rights,
such as failures in the market for individual legal representation or
government intransigence in the face of multiple successful individual
lawsuits.
A third line of analysis focuses on tradeoffs. These include groupindividual tradeoffs: do group rights interfere with, replace, or
somehow come at the expense of individual rights? They also include
group-society tradeoffs: what societal costs do group rights entail?
Group-group tradeoffs are another type: do group rights set the
interests of different groups against each other? Again, appreciation
for the existence of instrumentally determined group rights should
color these inquiries. 1980s-era challenges to group rights stressed
group-group tradeoffs. An equal protection right that benefited black
Americans as a group, so the argument went, unfairly disadvantaged
white Americans and fueled racial tension. 285 This critique implicitly
assumed that a socially determined metric defines groups qua rightsholders. The group rights that characterize IR litigation, by contrast,
have often evolved instrumentally, and they benefit thinly defined
groups joined together by no more than a shared interest in the public
good of adequate government performance. An accurate understanding of group rights as IR litigation presently involves them should help
analyzes of tradeoffs move past tired debates.
These normative beginnings suggest a rich vein of scholarly
inquiry to tap. The coalescence of group rights in various domains of
public law is just one development over recent decades that should
bring renewed attention to institutional reform. As vital as this
litigation’s issues are, as vulnerable as its plaintiffs can often be, and as
impactful as remedies can be for policy administration, few topics
deserve more scrutiny.

285

See Reynolds, supra note 210, at 1003.
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